Oral History Interview

with

ARTHUR LOVE

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By Michael R. Adamson

Adamson: Let's start with your background and your university training and how you came to work with Welton Becket, just until the time where you first had your relationship with Pankow; the broad overview.

Love: University of Illinois undergraduate, worked for a firm during all the time I was in college. I worked in an architect's office, because I basically even in those days paid your way through school. It was very cheap, but I still paid my way through school, and spent a couple of years after graduation working as a field superintendent, as I mentioned, for this firm, making decisions that architects are not legally allowed to do anymore. It was a very incredible learning experience, and maybe that's where I developed my respect for contractors.

Went to Colorado Springs. Really wanted to go to California, but I couldn't get any jobs there unless I moved there, and I couldn't afford to. Went to Colorado Springs and worked there for four years and ran into a high school buddy who was also an architect who was working on the Air Force Academy. We got reconnected. He went to California, went to work for Becket, called me one day and said, "We've got jobs out

here out the gazoo, if you want to come out here and interview," which I did, and got a job.

So in 1960, and this is really ancient history, 1960, my wife and I and three kids moved to California, and I started work for Becket as a designer. They moved me back to Chicago in 1970 because they had acquired a firm. So there's the time span. Initial time span in California was ten years.

I think that my first knowledge of Russ Osterman, and probably then Charlie Pankow, was not with Pankow. I believe my recollection—your research may be that they worked for Peter Kiewit, and they were on the Los Angeles Music Center. Kiewit was building a lot of that, and I was fortunate to design everything at the Music Center from the front of the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion on out, the garage, the plaza, and the two theaters, the Mark Taper Forum and the Ahmanson Pavilion. I was still a very self-centered designer in those days, but through that connection, I began to hear about Pankow.

So George [Hammond] was the one [who] brought them to our attention. My memory is not that clear as to what specific projects we could have been involved in in those days. First of all, '70 to '81, I was in Chicago. George was being sent around the country by Becket and came from their New York office to the Chicago office and took over as the managing principal there, and that's where he and I, after all these years of running around, got really reconnected. And because we were very interested in getting work, because he and I started to have the same attitude about design/build—I'd sort of evolved into more of a realist—we began to link. Whenever Pankow wanted us to be involved in the project, we began to link with them, and I guess they developed a comfort

level with us, because I was sort of excited about the whole notion that you could work directly with the builder and take advantage of their innovative ideas and incorporate them into the architectural design process and make it what I really felt, to quote Mr. Becket, was really more total design, because it involved the construction aspects. It wasn't just the artistic end of design, but it was the reality, because without a good contractor and a successful construction, you really don't have a building. We really had to admit that, that there was this major area in the process that needed to be recognized, and that Pankow really, as far as I knew, was one of the premier people in terms of innovation, using concrete in more creative ways, and sort of poking the architect, if you were involved in it, to reach out. Because it was very easy in that relationship just to say, "What do you want? We'll draw it up and you build it," but it was intriguing to be challenged and then, in turn, to challenge them. I mean, it wasn't always from the contractor or the architect, because we developed a relationship where the client would challenge both of us.

We did a hotel in Redwood City, California, a Sofitel Hotel, and this was after George and I had left Becket. As a matter of fact, we took that job with us. We talked to the client, and we were introduced to the client by Pankow, and the timing was such we were both going to leave, and the timing was such that the job, if it stayed with Pankow hand-in-glove, so to speak, it would be done in Corbin/Yamafuji & Partners' office. It was an interesting excursion, because the building was a satisfactory hotel. It's a nice-looking building. It doesn't really have incredible groundbreaking design to it, but it was a well-thought-out building, and we worked with them from day one, because it was determined [that], since it was Pankow, it was cost-analyzed, it was going to be a

concrete frame. The nature of the concrete frame in multi-story when you get up, I don't know, I forget the numbers, but up at least in the seven- or eight-story range that we were, it was very economical to use flying forms. I don't know if you've gotten into any of this Pankow, so I don't want to repeat things that you've talked about.

Adamson: No. No. I've heard of most of these things in passing, so whenever someone brings it up in a different context, it usually adds to what I know about it.

Love: The nature of flying forms is such that if you have any kind of perimeter columns, which you normally have in a building, and to use the efficiency of the form, you have to do one of two things. You either have to get the columns far enough so that this platform, which is on support legs and on which you pour the next floor, can be dropped slightly, just flown, literally pulled out and flown by crane up to the next level, or you have to be able to do this with it. [demonstrates with sheet of paper] You have to have fold-up sections. So you drop it and fold it, and then it goes out through the columns.

Well, the nature of hotels is such that, generally speaking, the column system is about the same spacing as the room width, and because it is that and because you're pouring at least the room width, you've got to be able to fold or collapse the forms. If I'm remembering correctly, they actually went back to the center line of the corridor. You have to be able to collapse the form enough for it to get out, go up, go back, reset.

So they were masters of that system, first of all. So when we thought about the hotel, and they said, "We want to use flying forms," and we said okay, but the owner doesn't want an all-glass façade, because it's sort of instinctive that then you would plug

the holes with glass. Well, in a hotel, you don't really do that anymore. At least in those days, the windows were smaller. They wanted a more intimate, less glassy exterior.

So working with Pankow, we came up with a system of a pre-manufactured wall system that could be put on the building, and in that wall system, the bay windows which the hotel developer wanted to give it sort of a French look, they were part of that system that then was manufactured on the ground, lifted up and flown, if you will, or lifted up and applied to the façade after the concrete is set and the staging had moved up ahead of it and then started this façade system, so that almost within a reasonable period of time when the concrete was poured, the façade was enclosed, which was an important aspect of developing the interior system, rather than having the thing sit there for several days while you hand-assembled whatever it was you were going to put up.

My recollection was the interesting thing on this was that it wasn't really precast concrete; that it was a wall system that was made up of steel studs and an exterior finish which was really an insulating element and a spray-on stucco finish, and it gave the walls integrity in terms of U-value, and the steel studs gave it its structural integrity. So, again, here was a concrete contractor that stepped away from concrete and was using this other material system to achieved the look that everybody wanted, but to do it more economically than he could have accomplished it with his own precast concrete system.

So again, that was cooperative effort, because the owner very specifically said he wanted bay windows, and that, I think, customarily, at least in those days, would have raised a lot of caution flags and, "Oh, god, this is going to be expensive, and we have to do this and we have to do that," and all this sort of thing. Here he came up with this nifty little system, working on the ground where they had absolute[ly] the best dimensional

control they could ever get over the project. So this was just really indicative of the way in which they [Pankow] worked, worked with a challenging client who didn't want to spend a fortune on a building, but he wanted it to be a first-class hotel, and achieving that objective.[1]

Adamson: I think the timing of that is, do I infer then that—

Love: That was in the—

Adamson: About '90, was it?

Love: No, that would be—came back to California in '81, went to down to Corbin/Yamafuji. That was in the eighties, the early, mid-eighties.

Adamson: So you left Becket before the merger in '88 with Ellerbe?

Love: Yes, I did. Yes. I was gone four years when it happened.

Adamson: I'm still trying to put together the early days of Pankow and the time that Charlie Pankow spent at Kiewit. I think I was aware that Kiewit was involved in the Music Center, but this is the first connection I've made or anyone's made to any Pankow people actually working on that. But it just brings to mind one thought. Did you hear or

[1] For more on the project, see, Richard M. Kunnath, "Hotel Sofitel," *Concrete International* 11 (January 1989).

were you aware of design/build or design/construct, as I've seen [called] it in trade articles, before any relationship with Pankow?

Love: Yes. As a matter of fact, going back to my college days, five of us college students decided to open an office while we were still in college, and one of the people that was involved with the office was advanced enough that they had a license. They were no longer a student. They had graduated. We did design/build houses for college professors, and one of the fellows was connected with the Lutheran Church, and they had a program of going out and jumpstarting churches in remote areas. So we designed a prefabricated church that could be put on a semi trailer, and so we manufactured it. We set up a manufacturing operation, it was all out of wood, and we contracted with a church and we built it. We sent people in the field to basically assemble this church. It was an A-frame church.

So contrary to what I was saying before about my egocentric architectural attitudes, I must have flushed that out of my brain when I got into the big leagues for a while. But there are roots back there, because I'm not sure why, but we just had this wonderful attitude in those days. Of course, we lost a lot of money when we built these houses, and there were four of them. They were interesting houses. So there it was.

Then when I got into the profession as a registered architect, you ran across a lot of different firms in those days that one way or another were doing design/build, and there were people that were design/building industrial buildings. That was a huge market in those days, and there are several companies that are still involved in that. They pre-engineer building systems, and they hire and they have in-house architects to put the

thing together and be able to comply with the local or state requirements if an architect is required, although in many cases, licensing will also allow a structural engineer to stamp the drawings.

There were some architects. There was one architect in Chicago who had a very, very large operation that did a lot of industrial work and processing plants and things like that, and they basically were engineer/architect/builder. Because when I went to Chicago, one of the building types that the Chicago office we bought was involved in was industrial. Some of these firms were very, very competitive because they didn't do these things. They'd almost literally pull them out of a drawer, re-site the building, make some changes, put a different processing operation inside this building envelope, and get it done faster than what the conventional architect was able to do. So it was a very serious aspect of certain kinds of building types.

Pankow, I think, was able to move into the office building arena and show some real cost benefits in being able to analyze and with their construction process, because I think they were one of the innovators of slipforming, which was the central core of an office building. In most cases, I think, Pankow did full concrete buildings, although they became more innovative as the years went on. But the core in some of these slipforms, you'd see a core standing up there in concrete with all the doors and everything, openings in it, and then here came the building.

But there was a logic to that that was irrefutable. In some cases, I guess they even had the crane tower inside as it came up, and then that was used subsequently to bring the building up. They came in then with precast concrete beams and precast concrete exterior and the whole thing just went up in an amazing way.

Adamson: I know this is a broad-brush question. I have some follow-up questions to break it down, but I'll just throw out the—and see where you go with it. What kind of firm was Welton Becket, and why did you think that lent itself to working with Pankow in a design/build setting? Or was there nothing—

Love: Well, truth be told, I think if there was anything in the firm, in the culture of the firm that would have allowed the relationship to work, it was probably more with Becket himself, because he was a businessman's architect. We were frustrated as designers sometimes because we felt that we weren't able to push the design envelope as far as some of our major competitors were, and it was primarily because Becket, his relationship with a client was as much a businessman-to-businessman [one]. They admired Becket because of his business acumen as much as they did the style and design of the buildings that he produced. We had a reputation of producing efficient, well-thought-out economical office buildings.

So it was probably that part of the culture as much as anything that would lend itself to that, and then because the—what we called production department, project management, project architect end of the office, was really in lockstep with that philosophy and they were dedicated to trying to build the kind of buildings that the client wanted built. In some cases, if they had a really aggressive designer, sometimes it was holding a designer off at arm's length while they built the building so he wouldn't get in the way.

So I think that undercurrent was probably what really was instrumental in any relationship that was established. George Hammond, was, as I say, if not *the* key person, was one of the key people at Becket, and probably because he was not a designer, he was a project person. He was a construction person, so he and I came at it from different roots. But I had it way back in my memory bank were the times I climbed through the mud, supervising a building and having this what we call creative buildings when we were in college. So he and I were able to connect on common philosophical grounds, I think, so that when these opportunities came up, because he and I had developed a mutual respect for each other. We were friends, and professionally, I think, we respected each other enough that we could come together on a venture like that with a contractor.

The guys at Pankow were great guys. I know he [Charlie Pankow] recruited a lot of top engineering graduates, I guess from Michigan and other schools.

Adamson: Purdue.

Love: Purdue, because that's where he graduated, yes.

Adamson: Right.

Love: And they were good people. They were not classic engineers where you think of belts and suspenders and a tunnel vision. These guys were really very creative in their own right, and they had an obligation to produce a building for whatever the budget was,

and they were dynamite on that. But they still had this creative streak in them that was a lot of fun to work with.

Charlie was sort of the major *domo*, and as with any successful business, he surrounds himself with people. In many cases, you hire people that are better than you, that have more talent than you, because the collective benefit of all that is that everybody flourishes then. So he had some really creative people as engineers working for him.

Adamson: I'll pull a couple things that struck me when I read the *Total Design* book on Welton Becket, just to push the point a little farther about compatibility, I guess.[2] One of the things mentioned in the book was that Welton Becket was one of the few large architectural firms that focused or recognized that construction cost control was something highly valued by clients. Was this part of what you were talking about, the businessperson's approach that lent—

Love: The firms that we were really competing with in those days were precursors to a lot of the firms that exist today. Many of them came from people that left and became big names. But Skidmore, Owings & Merrill was the primo [*sic*] firm in the United States at that time in terms of size and getting the plum buildings. As far as I know, I don't know how they sold architecture, if that's the right word, but I know how Becket sold architecture. Becket, at least in his office clients, it was a one-to-one relationship between someone in New York or someone in Minneapolis, or wherever they were, and Welton Becket. He sat down and talked to them as a businessman who happened to have

[2] William Dudley Hunt, *Total Design: Architecture of Welton Becket and Associates* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972).

a major architectural firm that produced good buildings. He was very, very budget-conscious, because he made a commitment to a businessman as a businessman. In some cases, it was a handshake. So there was a relationship there. He didn't sell that, "When we get through with you, you're going to have a corporate office building that everybody in the world is going to talk about." He said, "When we're finished with our relationship, we're going to have a corporate office building that you're going to be very happy with. But one of the reasons you're going to be happy is because it was built within your budget. You didn't have to go back to the board," blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, "to get more money." So there was that.

Adamson: You can just tick these off. A couple other things I wrote down out of the book that seemed to make Welton Becket and Pankow compatible partners on projects, one was there was a blurb mentioning that Welton Becket had pioneered the use of lightweight concrete in the GP [General Petroleum] headquarter[s] building in L.A. I'm wondering if working with concrete was something that lent itself to the Pankow relationship.

Love: Yes, I'm sure, because particularly in office buildings there was always this feeling as to which was really better, steel or concrete. Pankow, in many, many instances, was able to refute the argument that a lot of architects had that wasn't necessarily based on great knowledge, it was intuition, which wasn't always right, that steel was better, was faster, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. Pankow was able to say, and I mentioned it on the hotel, "With our system when we get to the roof, your building is

enclosed. It's got a floor in it that's a workable floor. The separation between vertical occupancies is established," blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. "The core is up."

Because with a typical steel frame, the frame goes up and you follow behind it, but you follow behind it, and even though they followed behind it, because they were using poured cores, the core was there. You didn't have to go back in and fireproof steel, because that was one of the factors that people forgot, was that you got a steel frame up, but now you've got to go back through and fireproof the whole thing. As asbestos became recognized as a problem, then that very fast go around and spray the heck out of the building was modified. It was a different process, different materials that had to be used. So concrete still was a very highly viable alternative.

This was probably typical of a lot of us that worked for Becket, was that we didn't fully appreciate his place in the scheme of things, because they also did one of the first suburban department stores. So, not to get off on Becket, but I think that a lot of us were—again, I always say it's like advertising and writing and film, things like that, painting and all of that. Architecture, if you are a designer, you have to have a lot of self-confidence. What happens is that that comes across in your everyday life as, "Boy, that guy thinks he knows everything." [laughs] Because how am I supposed to sell you the design of a building over someone else if I just can't convince you that I really know what I'm talking about? So that was one of those things that you had to deal with, because with Pankow you were dealing with contractors that were absolutely as convinced of their own merit and decision-making as you were of yours.

Adamson: One of the overlaps in culture, there's a statement in the book that Welton Becket people were well paid, challenged, had the freedom or space to demonstrate their talents, and were extremely loyal, which I found is characteristic of Pankow as well.

Love: Yes, that's right. Of course, I'm not sure about how it was in other offices, because I worked on and off for Becket for twenty-four years, but it was a kind of an office in those days where you got settled in there, you realized you were up to the challenge, and yet it was your career.

We had a few guys that left, some of the upper echelon that left and opened offices, but those of us that had titles instead of pay, everybody had vice presidents, and then you became a vice president or whatever it was. Anyway, that wasn't always true, but this vast array of people that were at this one level through all the departments, we were loyal. We worked our buns off for Becket. We were very proud of the office. There was a lot of pride in what we did, and we were proud because it was big. We were proud because it was like Pankow; it started out as one man who surrounded himself with people that supported his goal. So yes, there was a lot of similarity. I don't know how egocentric Charlie was, and I will say this, but I'm not ashamed to say it, I always felt that he had to have an ego to do what he accomplished, just like anybody would. I'm sure Becket in his own way had an ego, but he didn't wear it on his shoulder. He was a nice guy.

That really, and this is an aside. I'll take up some of your tape. When we were doing the Music Center and I ended up being primary designer on the rest of it, because the first building had been such a quagmire, Becket treated me and my wife so well. We

were invited to every fundraiser that he had at the office. He used the office to have the fundraisers come in and have these parties, and he invited my wife and I to every one of these parties as part of the sort of the docents to meet these people, take them around the office and everything. So I had a lot of respect for him as an employer and as a person, and I'm sure that [Russ] Osterman and Dean [Stephan] and all those guys had the same respect for Charlie. It's just it was there. And you don't get that much anymore, because there aren't very many one-man firms anymore. They're all operated differently. They're owned differently. They've evolved differently.

Adamson: There's also a statement, and this is probably all from the same page [in the book], but I didn't write it down that way, the recognition within Becket that buildings are built for the client—

Love: Oh, yes.

Adamson: —and not for the architect.

Love: Absolutely. I mean, we were reminded of that, yes.

Adamson: This is an older brochure I found at [the Library at the University of California] Berkeley.[3] I think it's from 1964. But I was struck that the parallels in the types of buildings that Pankow put up and what Becket was involved in.

[3] Welton Becket and Associates, *Vision . . . Through Supervision* (Los Angeles: Welton Becket and Associates, 1964).

[Begin Track 2]

Adamson: Well, the preface to talking about how Welton Becket and Pankow worked together, talk a little bit about this idea of total design and then how it worked in the design/build relationship with Pankow, because there seemed to be an overlap as to who would—if you had total design, it was implied in the book, anyway, in 1972 that Welton Becket had responsibility for many of the things that under design/build Pankow had responsibility for.

Love: Because the Total Design Office at that time was architectural, structural engineering, mechanical engineering, and electrical engineering. So if you take structural, to start with, out of that architectural equation and you move it over under the Pankow side, they did not function as structural engineers, but they preferred to hire their own structural engineers because of the working knowledge that these engineers had with Pankow's building systems.

There wasn't anything wrong with what Pankow did, it was just that they had an arm-around-the-shoulder kind of relationship with some of the engineers who were performing very professionally but were performing consistent with what Pankow's objectives were. There wasn't a lot of redundant stuff going on. So you take that out, and then you look at the mechanical/electrical aspect, and there were many contractors who were design/build mechanical contractors, at the very least, who would guarantee a price on a mechanical system, air conditioning, heating, ventilating. A lot of them had

electrical as part of their package, or there were electrical engineers that basically did the same thing.

So the Total Design in the seventies was a very valid concept because of the business model that most architects had, and most of them felt that the engineering disciplines were a profit center, only to realize in later years that they really weren't as profitable as they thought and that they, in fact, ended up creating as many problems, because suddenly now you were responsible for structural errors and all these things that went away, particularly when you did a design/build package, because somebody else took the responsibility for it.

Unfortunately, being trained in the late forties and early fifties in an area where everybody took responsibility for everything they did, it was difficult to see the way this litigious society evolved and the way architects in many cases were forced to move away from the decision-making. So I think once the architects realized that they had to give up some of this control, that it really wasn't beneficial, the operations such as what Pankow would have, where they would bring to the table under their umbrella all these other disciplines, and all you had to worry about was your architectural responsibility, that turned out to be a plus.

Now, the negative aspect of that is that the design/build, not so much the structural—the structural is more fluid—but the mechanical, electrical end of design/build, from an architect's standpoint, was difficult to work with sometimes because they were so singular-minded and they were so equipment-oriented that they didn't have an aesthetic bone in their body, and they didn't care whether a light was in the middle of the room or over there, things that architects went crazy for.

Well, Pankow, fortunately, was at enough of a—I don't know what it was. There was a hidden design stream in their culture. They wanted everything to look good, too, and I think in some cases they were willing to be—I use this word very advisedly—educated, where you could show somebody, "You know, don't you think that looks better there?"

"Yeah, you know, you're right." So that was a little nugget, so the next time that same person was on a job and the electrical was putting in lights around the building plans, those things became part of their thought process, too.

I don't think I answered your question.

Adamson: No, I think it's a big question. Part of the question, to break it down a little bit, is that design/build, of course, as explained several times to me, is there's one contract between the owner and in the case of Pankow, Pankow, and then the architect is part of that umbrella. The typical or the more traditional approach is there would be a contract between the architect and the owner and then the contractor and the owner.

Love: Right.

Adamson: So this new relationship or this umbrella relationship, did it take a special firm to be able to work under that relationship? Was Becket, in other words, exceptionally compatible or was this something that you would say most architects could live with if it was presented in the way that Pankow presented it?

Love: If they were dealing with Pankow, and now this is architect X out here, and for some reason he either had a connection with—here's how I'll answer it. Here's a client, and architect X knows this client through whatever, clubs, whatever it is, and this owner knows that this architect is capable of designing his building. But in one way or another, he has become acquainted with, let's say, Pankow or someone of their equal, and in conversations with his architect and with this contractor who becomes his contractor, he realizes that there's a business relationship that can take place, and he has the assurance of this contractor that he is comfortable working with this architect, if the architect is willing to contract with this client through Pankow, in effect, that the contractor has no problem with it at all.

So as this progresses, each one of these three members of this team has to develop a level of confidence in the process in the relationship, and the easiest relationship to establish is owner-contractor. Even though a lot of architects—and Becket was that way—had a very, very strong relationship with clients as business-to-business, but the owner may say, "I don't see anything wrong with that. I'm still going to get architect X, and actually I'm not too sure but what maybe having a few controls on cost as an overlay on this process might not be a bad idea, might be a pretty good business arrangement to have."

But there might be an architect Y who would say, "No. Look at the awards on my wall. I really don't need this in my career. People are coming to me. Why should I involve myself in this process?" So it would be a deal-breaker, so to speak.

But it's professional respect between the contractor who has enough respect for the architect to understand that there is a possibility of a relationship being established.

In many cases, the architect doesn't have this relationship with a client. The client has a relationship with the contractor. Because Pankow was very aggressive in marketing, and I mean, if I was somebody from Pankow's office and you were a client and you hadn't really talked to any architects to the extent that you picked one or had one as a friend, and I came in and I said, "Look, we can do this. I want you to look at all these buildings that we've done with this arrangement, and you can call any of these people. You can talk to anybody and check us out, because this is what we can do for you. Time. Time is money. We can build this building to the quality level that you want, and even if you want to work with us and select an architect, that's fine, we'll do that, someone [with whom] you feel comfortable. We're not going to bring some guy in that you just hate. We'll work with you on this, but we can save you time, which is money. We can save you money because we'll guarantee that this thing is built for the dollars that you want." What better deal could you have when you think about it from that standpoint?

So the architect in that relationship has to have enough confidence in the fact that he's really still contributing what he would contribute under this so-called normal relationship. No one is taking him out of the picture as an architect. He still is identified. He still gets invited to the opening cocktail parties. Everybody gets to pat him on the back and tell him what a great job he did. But actually, I found it was just a contractual relationship that was different, that's all.

Adamson: This will probably come out when we talk a little bit about more projects specifically, but this just brings to mind the more abstract question of: If the owner/client brings the architect with him to the design/build relationship, is it more typical that

Pankow or the owner has to educate or advise the architect of this arrangement whereby there's one contract between the owner and the contractor and you're, in effect, working with us, but legally you're working under that?

Love: Anybody that's worth their salt and has a firm that would be of enough substance to be invited into that relationship is going to understand from the get-go that—I mean, all that guy has to say is, "The way we operate is everyone contracts with us." And with that relationship goes certain benefits, too, because it changes. I don't remember the details. I think it changes the relationship. You still have errors and omissions and things like that, but you and the owner aren't trying to chase down a contractor and hold responsible for what he built, because the primo [*sic*] relationship between owner and builder is with owner and contractor or owner and builder. I think probably Pankow was one of those firms that preferred to refer to themselves as builders, maybe contractors. Right?

Adamson: Right.

Love: And they were.

Adamson: Right. One more question that I pulled from the *Total Design* book, before we get into some of the Pankow projects. There was a lament by the author in that book about the lack of opportunity for collaboration between those who designed the building

and those who produced it, so that the question specific to this context is, is design/build a solution to that lack of collaboration? Does it necessarily—

Love: It certainly is one solution. I think in one way or another, if you were to probe contracts that are written today on major structures, I think you'll find that the builder, if not an investor, has a primary role in this thing, because even in our day, so many of the exterior systems were tested, and the builder had to be involved in that process. Window systems were subjected to intensive high-pressure, high-velocity wind and water to check it, water intrusion, and there were mockups built and there were all these things that were built as tested devices or constructionable, buildable entities. Can we really build this thing, and if we do, how is going to look and how do we assemble it, sort of thing.

So the contractor in any successful venture had to be a critical part of the process. It wasn't always the case. There was always the inevitable animosity and lawsuits that happened in some relationships, and I suppose maybe Pankow had a couple of those stuck in a closet someplace that they didn't want to talk about.

Adamson: What was the first Pankow project you were involved with?

Love: Well, now you're testing my memory. I was going to say give me a list of Pankow projects and I'll tell you—

Adamson: —which ones you were on.

Love: Did you develop any sort of understanding of what Pankow-Becket did together?

Adamson: The only thing I can pin down was the 411 East Wisconsin Building.[4] There was also Kaiser Oakland, which seems—was a Becket project, and I think it was a Pankow project, so I just put them together, although Kaiser is all over Oakland, so I'm not sure if there was a specific project. Then Dean Stephan basically had the—and I didn't follow up on specific projects, but he said you did a lot of work with Pankow. So we talked specifically about the 411 East Wisconsin Building. I probably should have come back to him, but one of the questions I had that I didn't get any answer to were what, if anything, in L.A. that Becket had done.

Love: Let me think a minute.

Adamson: From my list of Becket projects, I haven't been able to make a match.

Love: Kaiser was before my time. I didn't join Becket until '60.

Adamson: Right, and Pankow started in '63.

Love: Right. It seems to me, and I'm trying to think of—I'm just writing some stuff down here. See, we did a lot of competitive proposals together, did a lot of them, and as is the nature of those things, the proposer is not always the successful candidate. But we did—I was trying to think of the location this morning, because I doubt that any of those

[4] Chicago-based Harry Weese & Associates was the architect of record on this project.

things are in the record. I believe we worked on and we did the Hyatt in Louisville. I know we did the Sofitel in California. I wasn't involved in it, but I believe there was a bank building in Louisville that they did.

Adamson: Citizens Bank.

Love: Yes. Right.

Adamson: With Winmar?

Love: Yes. See, now you're bringing back some memories because Winmar was involved in a lot of the projects. They were, I guess, the developer entity or something like that. They helped choreograph and keep everything moving in the right direction.

Adamson: Right. Pankow did a lot of work with Winmar, and especially if you look at projects outside of California, Hawaii, and the Pacific Northwest, a lot of the projects east would sort of follow Winmar across.

Love: Did you see a shopping center outside of Boston that Winmar was involved in?

Adamson: Yes.

Love: Okay. I was involved on that project.

Adamson: I think Bob Law talked to me about that. There was also Roosevelt Mall in Long Island. I don't know if there was any connection there.

Love: I think we did some follow-up work on that for them. I forget the name of this one outside of Boston. It was a community suburban area in Boston, and, again, it was an unusual relationship because it was design/build. My recollection was it was an old—I can't remember the architects. That's the story.

Adamson: Was it Framingham?

Love: Yes, I think it was Framingham. It was an old mall. Victor Gruen was the architect on it, and Pankow came in to do remedial work and to expand it, and that's when we got into it. We did the Filene's department store, mall shops, and a whole bunch of stuff. I made some terrible trips to Boston in the winter from California on that one. [laughs]

Adamson: Bob Law started in '71 with Dean. No, '73, and I think he said that was his first job.

Love: So that was in the Chicago office, then.

Adamson: And he went out to Boston.

Love: Yes. I think we did a lot more work in the Chicago office than we did in the L.A. office, and, of course, that was after Becket died. It was a whole new regime at Becket in those days, and they were into the acquisition route then. New York and Houston and Chicago and San Francisco, we had offices.

Adamson: But also another, just to cue the memory, I talked to Bob Heisler and Lee Sandahl, the KMI HVAC guys.

Love: Yes. That's where they came from. I was trying to—yes, KMI. I'll never forget KMI. And they were good guys. I mean, initially they sort of put up with me ranting and raving. But, no, they were good. They basically had the same overall objectives in the long run. They still enjoyed making money. [laughs] They never did anything to placate me that would lose money on their side.

Adamson: Bob Heisler said that KMI did a lot of projects where there was both Becket and Pankow involved, and most of the projects they talked to me about were California projects. I don't think they followed Pankow around the country.

Love: No.

Adamson: They talked about—was it Penney's? They did a lot of work with one of the department stores. They kind of went all over Southern California.

Love: Yes. We did Fashion Island Shopping Center in Newport Beach. The original Fashion Island, I was the designer on that, and there was a Penney's store. It's hard to remember, because a lot of those places are out of business now or they've been absorbed by people. Yes, I think KMI would show up on these jobs because a lot of those, even if there was a conventionally bid job, a lot of the mechanical, because of the nature of it was design/build, or someone would set the criteria, and then they would take the job and expand it and pick the actual equipment that was going to meet the criteria and do the final design of it.

Adamson: Lee commented that both you and George [Hammond] were comfortable, as he put it, with design/build.

Love: Yes. Yes, we were.

Adamson: Was there any part of it you were leery about or anything?

Love: Once I got through the first five minutes of letting everybody know who I was and none of them were impressed. No, it was fun. It was a lot of fun.

Adamson: Can you say that Pankow was like the team leader in the design process in this relationship, or is that not a way to put it?

Love: Well, you know, they probably were, but they let us believe that we were. Somebody obviously has to lead, and so since they had contract, they were obviously the de facto leaders, but they deferred to us quite often and said, in effect, what—sometimes Dean [Stephan] used to delight in this. He'd say, "Here. Here's the problem. You come up with some solutions that we can look at, and then we'll pick one."

So what we had then was, "Okay, are we going to do a bunch of lousy solutions and then one that we want them to pick, or are we going to try and make them all viable?" which is usually what we did, so that no matter what he picked—and a lot of times, they would say, "What do you suggest?"

And we'd say, "We think this is good for these reasons."

And they'd say, "Well, yeah, if you can change this, because it will save some money in the construction, that's the way we'll go." So that's the way it would end up. I don't think it was ever adversarial that I can ever remember.

Adamson: You anticipated a couple questions I had from Dean's interview, talking about the 411 East Wisconsin project. He laid out how that whole thing came together with Pankow and Winmar. He said specifically that Winmar wanted what he called a, quote, unquote, "statement building," and that you and George Hammond had done a lot of work with Pankow. So, as Dean tells it, this is, what, '85, mid-eighties, I think, the project, that Pankow sought out Welton Becket because of the work you had done previously. Then he says, quote, "You guys came up with some great ideas for the thing using parameters given to you by Pankow." So here was Pankow wanting to meet the desire of the client for a building that looked great, and you responded.

Love: Yes, and when I say it was fun, that was the enjoyable part of it, was being challenged not to do something down and dirty, cheap, but to do something that had merit to it and was going to have quality to it, but still meet these very strict parameters that they set up and, I don't remember that building that well, but work within the parameters that they established in terms of their construction process. See, that was always the underlying thing. In a sense you can come up with any idea you want, as long as it fits this process and as long as it fits these parameters. It was like, well, gee, that's not an unreasonable challenge. I mean, that's life. That's realism. That's business.

Adamson: I think Dean validates what you said about the leader in the design process. He said he always made sure that you guys made the presentations.

Love: Oh, yeah. Well, I had a reputation in those days. I wasn't as longwinded as I am now, but I was more articulate. For some reason, I was able sort of intuitively to make a good presentation, because I had a certain methodology, a certain process I went through of explaining a building so that when I got through, I hoped that they understood what the building was and what its merits were. Because we were representing the builder in a sense, we always tried to not fawn on them, but incorporate this whole idea of the process, the building process, into it. And, yes, we did. We made a lot of presentations for them.

Adamson: Dean also said that Pankow never dictated the design to the architect, and the only other architect I've talked to to date about Pankow projects, remarked that the relationship with Pankow gave him quite a bit of freedom allowing the architect to just do the design construction documents all the way through the project.

Love: Again, from my perspective, it was exciting because part of the design of a building is the total building, including the structure and everything. You don't engineer it, but you think it, and it was exciting to be able to have someone from Pankow's side that they were always thinking of innovative ways to build buildings to save time and to make them more cost-effective. So this was really exciting to be able to be on that side of the table, so to speak, when you were designing a building and know that what you were putting down was viable, that there were things that you could do to solve some interesting design problems.

Adamson: Now that particular building was built right through the cold dead of winter.

Love: Yes.

Adamson: I'm just wondering when construction's under way under this design/build relationship, you as the architect are there on the site periodically, or does Pankow take over at some point and—

Love: No, they don't let you off the hook. They hold your feet to the fire. You did this, even though they were the leader. You still did this. If there were problems, you'd come to the field and we'd work out a solution to the problem. A lot of contractors, when it was a bid job and they took it over, if there was a problem, they'd come up with their own solution and, in some cases, back-charge the architect for it or whatever, come up with an awful solution. But Pankow, to my knowledge, never did that. They always said, "We're going to have a job meeting."

Sometimes, yes, quite often, I guess most generally, there were at least monthly job meetings that you attended, because they still had you in a process of validating certain things and signing off on certain things and so you were involved in the process. I mean, you weren't sitting outside looking in. You didn't have to beg to be there.

Adamson: This other architect stated that the errors and omissions that result from a traditional design/bid/build approach often created opportunities for owners to blame architects, and I think you just spoke to that. So he went on to say that design/build insulated the architect from this type of exposure to the owner. Is that something that you feel as well?

Love: Yes, because the builder was on the line, and there was a reflection unless he wanted to hire all of us, any mistake that was made resulted in something. One of Murphy's Laws I just discovered is you never can do just one thing. Everything, every one act, has a consequence. It's the same way with a mistake. A mistake in itself results in one or more outcomes, and Pankow, because he was the builder and was in charge,

was ultimately responsible. But the architect, although he may not be involved in lawsuits, he was involved in remedies in spades, unless their relationship had gotten to the point where they said, "We're not going to call that guy anymore because we're not getting any satisfaction." But that never happened. It was always, "Get them on the phone. Let them know what's happened. Get them involved in the solution." But in terms of what he was talking about, it wasn't isolation, it was insulation, because isolation you wouldn't have known what was happening.

Adamson: Right. That's a good way of putting it. One more comment from Dean Stephan in his interview. He said that his experience was that sometimes the architects were not able to respond creatively when given the opportunity to do so in the design/build context; that even though they had this freedom they'd come back with what they were familiar with; I think he even said the cookie-cutter designs that they had been used to. So even given this freedom, sometimes the architect didn't respond as Dean might have expected.

Love: Yes, I think that's right. I think that, yes, you had to be very careful that you didn't develop some sort of an attitude of compensating for this relationship, of reading into it more constraint than there really was, because I think that probably the bottom, bottom, bottom line was: There was no constraint except cost. Well, cost and the building system itself, whatever the building materials were that you were working with, because there was an understanding that in certain periods of Pankow's development, they used a lot of precast exterior, a lot of their buildings you can spot, San Jose and

places like that, because they used it. It wasn't cookie cutter, but they used a building system. So the constraint was the building system, which is no different than a client coming and saying, "I want a steel and all-glass building." I mean, there's a constraint.

So in many cases, I think we kidded ourselves about design freedom, so to speak. But anyway, no, if anything, I felt that in many cases, speaking somewhat immodestly, that we rose to the challenge that they presented to us, rather than going, retreating. We said, "If you're going to toss the gauntlet down, then, by god, I'm going to pick it back up and throw it right back in your face, because we're going to solve this problem."

Adamson: Talk about how the use of concrete enabled you or architects in general to realize their designs and still control costs.

Love: Well, there, having been involved in a lot—not a lot, but many buildings that were predetermined structurally, it was very seldom, I believe, that the architect really made that decision in the quiet of his office, if maybe never. Any office building, any development process worth its salt, had people from the construction end, even if they were just consultants involved in it, because there was a cost analysis that took place if you were really going to evaluate it.

So when you came to Pankow, you came to concrete, and concrete, even though it's a fluid material in a sense, had a very strict limitation, particularly when you were building in seismic areas, because there were a lot of constraints that you had to deal with. Pankow, I think, rather than saying, "This is it. This wall will be solid because it must be solid because of blah, blah, blah." If you said, "You know, we really need to

figure out a way to get an opening in that wall because of whatever reasons, it's critical," they would sit down and they'd say, "Okay, let's try and figure this out."

I just found—I liked both sides of the material spectrum, but there was a lot of intrigue and interest and creativity in concrete, particularly in the exteriors because of the fact that it was a material that could be cast, you know, starts out in a sort of an oatmeal consistency, and it goes into a form of some kind, and when it comes out, you've got this image of a repetitive piece or a series of parts that are connected or something. Anyway, it's got that quality to it that really makes it intriguing, and I think that's where we enjoyed concrete.

As I say, there was a prejudice. There was a whole body of prejudice built around it by some of the major—like, back in those days, Tischman, all their buildings, at least the ones Becket did, they were all of a type, all steel frame, all glass skins, because Tischman was convinced that this was the only way to build fast and cheap. Unfortunately, a lot of the people that built that way, they built fast, they built cheap, the buildings ended up being cheap. Pankow built fast and inexpensive, and I'm sure they've done some down-and-dirty buildings in their day that they had to.

On the other hand, and I'm remembering now, an industrial project that we did for a Japanese electronics company called Clarion, that was a distribution warehouse and office building, and it was a classic steel frame industrial building. It was built to very strict guidelines time-wise, cost-wise, and it had a limited aesthetic, but there were certain things that we had to meet. It was an interesting project to be involved on, and this was—I have trouble keeping myself in Chicago or in California with it, because I went back to California for Becket. Anyway, it was a design/build. I want to think it was built

in California. But George and I were involved in it, and it was a successful project. Japanese are very demanding, almost relentless in their demands. But that's the way their whole culture is, you know, there is no disobedience, even within the business community; you follow. So it was an interesting, I'm sure, tightrope for Pankow to walk with that client and showed a lot of skill on their part to be able to hold it together.

Adamson: So you mentioned this, just going way back, I assume from what you said about the Kiewit and the L.A. Music Center that it's likely or for sure that Charlie Pankow knew Mr. Becket.

Love: I'm sure. I'm sure. As I recall, they were key people in the Kiewit organization, because I think what George told me is that when they left Kiewit that was a big blow to Kiewit, because I think it was Russ and Charlie together, and they were some of his best, the company's best people, when they left. Well, it's subsequently proved out. [laughs]

Adamson: I've heard multiple versions about Charlie stepping out, whether it was a blow or not. One was that the Kiewit Company wasn't really set up for building buildings, they were dams and bridges and highways, and that Charlie had a vision to expand the Building Division, and whether it was the local Kiewit guys or the corporate back in Nebraska basically said, "Well, we're really not that interested, so good luck to you if you want to go out." So I've heard that maybe they didn't have the blessing to leave, but they weren't all that upset about it because—

Love: That may be.

Adamson: Or I've also heard that more in line with your version. The only thing financially, I think their money or at least on a return basis, was in the big civil engineering dams.

Love: Oh, I'm sure it was, because there was a lot of contractors in those days that were doing a lot of infrastructure work and stuff like that in those years, and a lot of them ended up spinning off building divisions of all types: specialty, manufacturing, all sorts of things, government.

Adamson: This is just for my own information, I guess. This book, *Total Design*, was written in '72. The idea of total design, did that persist after the death of Becket, or in the next ten years or so did that kind of wane?

Love: I think it waned. Again, it was consistent with what I was mentioning about the full-service office, because we had a huge interior design division that did a lot of department store work, just a phenomenal amount of department store work, and one of the partners that left Becket, he took another fellow with him, and that was their forte, was department store interiors; merchandising, they used to call it. So as at some point in time, I think the business models began to be reconsidered and things began to change.

One of the problems with total design is that when a client comes to you, he's faced with, in some cases, all or nothing, or you could feel he was faced with all or

nothing, and a lot of the clients changed, too, from the one person in New York where he and his son and the board of directors in New York who made nothing but business decisions to companies that now had construction divisions and things like that, and they were saying, "No, no, no, we don't want to hire these architects/structural engineer." It's a captive. "We've got this firm X over here that's the leader. We'll get them for the same dollars and we'll control them. They're going to be contracted directly with us." So there was this realization that, first of all, as an architect, you couldn't hire the best structural engineers, because they didn't want to work for an architect in his office. They wanted to work and have their own firm and work for one of the flagship structural engineers in the world. So that was an evolutionary thing, and as part of that evolution was the fact that total design as a marketing strategy just didn't work anymore.

Adamson: So on the Pankow projects, they brought their structural engineer.

Love: A structural engineer.

Adamson: A structural engineer. They brought you as an architect.

Love: Right, and they brought KMI as—they had civil engineers. They had all of that.

Adamson: As it's been told to me, basically all these people are in the room, so to say, in the design process.

Love: Oh, those meetings were unbelievable. [laughs] And I'll say this on the record, Pankow had this second—I don't know if they're still in their converted bank building outside of Pasadena, but there was a second-story conference room that proportionately was the worst conference room in the world because it was too narrow, and you got that room full of people, and it was like, okay, if Joe wanted to get up and leave, Sam and Marty and Pete had to get up, too, so that Joe could get out of the room. And it was hot. And they packed it. I mean, they didn't leave anybody out of the meetings, because they wanted everybody in there, and they wanted everybody in on the decision. Actually, that was very energetic and very exciting to be involved in that as an architect, because a lot of times you wouldn't be. You'd be left out of the equation, and the owners would make independent decisions with people, and then you'd have to fight your way back in and get what turned out maybe to be a mistake corrected.

Adamson: I think they moved down the hill to Pasadena about four or five years [ago], after Charlie died.

Love: It was an interesting office, but it had its little foibles and, of course, as they grew, they had people almost hanging from the chandeliers to find space for them.

Adamson: I think if it's the same building, it was a converted post office.

Love: Maybe it was a post office. I thought it was a bank.

Adamson: Originally, or a bank.

Love: It had a two-story column in the middle of it, balcony, with offices around the perimeter, though.

Adamson: Just to get on the record your career, so you said ’84. So you and George left Becket and you went to work for—

Love: Corbin/Yamafuji & Partners.

Adamson: And this is in California?

Love: Yes. It was in Irvine.

Adamson: And it was in this capacity that you did the Sofitel project.

Love: They were one of the leading—CYP, as they call it—were one of the leading residential architectural firms in California, and they wanted to get into commercial architecture. They had done a few commercial buildings. So George and Corbin were college buddies for years. George never—and I’ll say this one thing for the man, he never dropped any friend from all the way back to high school football, and this guy had friends over eons. So Corbin and he were buddies from [University of] Washington days, and they kept in touch.

Anyway, he was getting dissatisfied with Becket, and I was getting dissatisfied with Becket, and so he said, "I've got this opportunity. Would you like to come down? You can be the design director in the Commercial Division, and I'll run the division." So that's it. We went down with the Sofitel in our pocket, basically, and did that job.

Adamson: Then there were more Pankow projects?

Love: I think we did the Clarion then. I believe the Clarion was done not by Becket, but by CYP. It was George and I. The connection was always George and I.

Adamson: Now, you mentioned the Washington connection. Tom Verti, who was a University of Washington football player, I guess a little younger.

Love: Yes, he's a nice guy. I liked Tom. When he came in, I guess he ended up in San Diego, didn't he?

Adamson: Yes. They said they for a while had a San Diego office.

Love: Because we worked on a big—it never went ahead, but there was a hotel in the Hotel Circle, they call it, in San Diego where Interstate 8 comes in, and there's that valley that has hotels on both sides. There was a venerable hotel there that had been there for years, and we developed a high-rise addition to it and did a lot of work on it, and

apparently it was never built. We went through contract documents and everything on that thing, and Tom was deeply involved in that.

As a matter of fact, I can honestly say that I never met anybody at Pankow that I didn't eventually like, and that sounds maybe strange, but there were a couple guys that I always thought were a little heavy-handed in their relationship to the architect, but I found out who they really were and the way they really worked, and we became friends. So I always thought that was somewhat of a unique relationship with an office that big, but you get into that and everybody that you ran into, you felt comfortable with and you could stop by and say hello and that kind of thing. I think it was a mark, certainly not of me—it was a mark of the quality of people that they hired. There was a lot of self-assurance in that office, a lot of self-assurance, which was a part of their culture. They couldn't do what they did and succeed the way they did unless they didn't really felt comfortable in their own skin that they were ultimately doing the right thing.

Adamson: So when did you retire?

Love: I quit work.

Adamson: When did you quit work?

Love: Actually, I just, I think, been forced into retirement. Anyway, I quit. I left active professional work in '92. I took my early retirement at sixty-two and went on the road for four years with my wife, full-time RVing, and then came back and startled dabbling

in home remodeling and stuff, and ended up the last nine years I had a consulting practice and I did what I call problem-solving for a firm that actually evolved out of CYP. One of the partners left. I ended up CEO for six months when CYP split.

Anyway, I went back to work for them as a consultant, because they realized they needed gray hair in the office, and so I did a lot of problem-solving for them, and in a sense it was sort of reminiscent of the design/build days, because I would take a building that had been designed and partially detailed and figure out how they were going to be able to build it and have it look like we wanted it to look. So I went way back to my construction roots and all the teaching that I got from Pankow.

Adamson: And brought it to bear.

Love: Yeah.

Adamson: This is just a point of curiosity. The *Total Design* book touted your expertise in airport design. How did that come about?

Love: That was interesting. I don't know if it is worth being on the record, but we had a group that at one time Becket felt very altruistic. We had the Becket research operation, [unclear] called it, and they put a guy in charge of it—I was miffed, because I felt I should have been in charge of it because I did all the work, he got all the glory. Anyway, we were doing some work for United Airlines at LAX, and they were going to build a

huge new terminal. This was before the 747s. They were in production. That was before the supersonic, Concorde. They were on design.

So we got an idea we should design an airport. I think we called it a hypersonic something something airport that is in anticipation of all this new technology as a research project. So we knew that someday—only I still don't think they've built it—that someday they were going to convert the Palmdale Airport system to a regional airport. So we said, "Okay, we're going to put this airport out at Palmdale. We're not just going to design an airport; we're going to design a city that has this airport as its core industry," and so we did a lot of work discovering. If you have a regional airport, what does it spin off? And, actually, it's incredible, directly and indirectly, what the presence of that airport, and we ended up with that it would support a city of three and a half million people.

If you wanted to take that as a genesis—now most of them are built after the fact. But if you really wanted to look at it as a genesis, it produces directly and indirectly business activity that will support all the collateral stuff, and so we designed a city of three and a half million people that had the airport as its center and all sorts of transportation systems that fed into it and everything, and put together a presentation that we made to a couple of airport entities, just to show them what we thought might be happening in the future. A lot of what we suggested, probably because of its incredible logic, not its brilliance, but its logic, came to pass. The Atlanta Airport, which was built after that, the basic concept of that airport was consistent [with] what we were thinking of, a lot of things.

Adamson: No, I bring it up because the Pankow people, they don't do residential, but they don't necessarily specialize in any one area, and it struck me that you as an architect were pretty broad-based as well.

Love: Yes, because I did a lot of theaters. I did the two in Los Angeles, and we did the Grand Ole Opry in Nashville, which in its day was a breakthrough because it was basically the world's largest television broadcasting theater at the time, 4,000-seat theater that looked like a theater, but it was really designed as a television broadcasting facility.

Adamson: Is that right?

Love: Yes. Radio and television.

Adamson: Neat. Now, we were going through Pankow projects, so maybe this question is out there, but do you have a favorite Pankow building, not necessarily one you that worked on, but one that you know about or strikes you as distinctive?

Love: Probably in all honestly, no. That's a disappointing answer.

Adamson: No, I get that from most people. It's like people asking me my favorite song.

Love: Well, music I could probably—

Adamson: You could probably come up with.

Love: I have favorite buildings, but no.

Adamson: Here's some questions about Charlie Pankow the person.

[Begin File 3]

Adamson: Do you recall first meeting Charlie Pankow?

Love: Not the actual event, but I'm sure when it was was a meeting, probably going into the office, meeting him, being introduced, and probably having been preapproved by Russ [Osterman] or somebody, so that he had some idea of why this person was there.

He was involved in a lot of things, but, again, I think he was a good chief executive because he trusted the people that worked with him, worked for him, worked with him. So I don't know, maybe he did in company business micromanage, but in the project end, from our perspective, he really didn't micromanage.

Adamson: So the person with whom you interacted from Pankow would have been what they call the project sponsor, I think that's their term.

Love: I think that's what they use, yes. Dean, Russ, that whole group of people that actually grew from the beginning until the later years when a lot of what I call the

younger guys were involved. A lot of those names I forget. There was a fellow up in San Francisco in their office, really a nice guy. I'm trying to remember his name. Can't. But anyway, that was project sponsor. I don't know what they call them. All I knew is that was the, what they now say, he was the go-to guy.

Adamson: So what traits or strengths or capacities would you say overall make the Pankow firm successful builders? What distinguishes them from other contractors, if you will?

Love: Honesty. Integrity. Because their name came up a lot in our conversations, I never heard anybody say, "Oh, my god, that bunch. Oh, holy smokes. Didn't you hear about how they took so-and-so?" I think there was a lot of that [integrity], and it had to come from the top. I mean, you don't put a guy who has no integrity in charge of a business, and then hire a bunch of people with integrity and have it really work out. Just doesn't work. So it had to come from the top.

An incredible hard work ethic. They worked hard, really hard. No matter what level, they put in whatever it took to get the job done wherever it was, which is, I guess, really to say, not to demean them, but they had all of the attributes that a good, solid, honest business should have. They had them. Their word was their bond, as far as I know. You really can't ask for anything more than that.

They were creative. I think, like you said, Charlie had a vision, but he also had enough intelligence to realize that he needed visionaries with him to be able to realize that vision and to also probably say, "You know, Charlie, you're a visionary, but I've got

an idea here. I'll try this on as a vision of where we can go," because I think there was a lot of that. I'm not so sure, quite frankly, whether when he started out—we'll never know unless somebody had talked to him about it. When he started out, did he really feel that when he said design/build that he was almost—you can't turn them around because design has to come before build, but did he really feel in his heart of hearts that the important part of this whole thing was the builder? It's by some cosmic means that the design would come together, but the builder was the lead and that he hired people who were young, aggressive, innovative in themselves, and that they actually developed the culture that said we can hire architects that are very, very creative people, and we're going to all benefit from this, because I really think that that was their attitude.

Adamson: Especially on those early jobs, the description of those that I've gotten is that they'd start their essentially salvage jobs that, quote, unquote, "salvage jobs" that were designed but they cost too much. Then Charlie came in and said, "I can do this." So the design was there, but he brought a cost solution.

Love: See, if there was ever a setup for a bad relationship between an architect and a builder, that was it. That really was it.

Adamson: Right. "I can't build this."

Love: But I'll tell you, there's a lot of those still around. Not so much the building. The firm that I was consulting with, they were given a lot of projects that had been designed

by some name architects who just couldn't finish the job, and took them over and finished them and got them built. I'm sure that that was the underlying problem with the architecture profession, is getting into a lot of situations where there was not at that time the presence of anyone in the team that really had any deep construction knowledge, that was an owner representative, that could pound the table and say, "No, no, no, no, no. We've costed this out." In those days, you'd be 10 million over budget instead 2 billion over budget. So in spite of what we might have felt, there was a real need for someone like Pankow to come along and salvage these projects, because there was a lot of time and money invested in them.

I think he might have done that with the Citizens Bank project. I think that it was a bitter pill to swallow, but I think that Becket was the architect of record on that and the job was over budget, and he came in and pulled it together and so that they were able to build a building. Still another associate of ours who has passed away, Randy Myers, was an interior designer at Becket, and he did a huge interior design operation for the bank spaces, and I think the whole thing ended up being a very, very satisfactory relationship, and it was probably because it was a lifesaver. They threw a life preserver to the job from Pankow's boat, and they saved it.

Adamson: Was the cost savings in the use of concrete or in the redesign of the building?

Love: I think it was probably the building is a structural entity in the construction process of building it a certain way. It was more time-efficient and, as a result, time and cost-efficient, because, you know, time always equals dollars. It's irrefutable, and so as a

consequence, if you can build a building that is as well built in less time, it's going to cost less money.

Adamson: When you were working with Pankow, did you get a sense of their influence on the industry, or did you get a sense that they had a niche that they were filling, or did you get a sense of a broader influence that they were in?

Love: They were always involved in the—what was it, CSI?

Adamson: ASCE? ACI?

Love: Something like that.

Adamson: American Concrete Institute.

Love: Yes. They were always going off to conferences and presenting papers and things like that, so I think they were probably very influential. They started out probably as a niche builder because of what they were specializing in, but, I feel that, without intimate knowledge, just knowing that, well, Dean was off at another conference and so-and-so had a paper to present, that they were always presenting new information or an old idea that had been rethought and renovated and brought up to date kind of thing.

Adamson: The statistics I saw, and I brought this up with the Pankow people, is that design/build is such a great idea, but it took, it seemed, an inordinately long period of time to catch on, and some of it's because of the public sector bidding requirements.

Love: Yes.

Adamson: That was kind of an area that you couldn't get into.

Love: Yes. Right.

Adamson: But that also, I think you mentioned earlier, people who were doing, quote, unquote, design/build were doing it in a way that gave design/build a bad way because they weren't doing it like Pankow was doing it.

Love: Right. It was cheap, and they found their own niche. One of the niches, I think, understandably, was in heavy industry. Some of these huge processing plants, this one firm from Chicago did a lot of meatpacking processing plants all over Europe, and the idea there as you get it up, you get it up fast, you get it up cheap, so we can get our processing. Because the installation of the process equipment sometimes took longer than to build the building by the time you got all that stuff in there. Very elaborate.

So I think you're right. They did do it. And the architect profession didn't help itself. I mean, we come from a long line of dilettantes. You look back in history at these

big cathedrals and buildings, and the architect was just some sort of a supernova persona kind of thing.

But the thing that was interesting was that in some of those older buildings, the architect was also the builder. See, that's the contradiction, is that they evolved from a person who had intuitive knowledge, because there was no way to calculate how you build a cathedral, except to have it fall down around your ears or just feel in your gut that it was going to stand up. The builders, the stonemasons, and the architects all worked together to make those things possible. Then later on, there developed this adversarial relationship.

It would be interesting to go back and backtrack and figure out how all that started, because people, when I was in the profession, would still talk to you as if you built that building. "No, no, no, I didn't build that building. I designed it." But there were a lot of other people involved in it besides me.

Adamson: Fair enough. I'm basically at the end of my questions. This is the point where I usually ask people if they have some anecdote, something they haven't said, that characterizes the Pankow Company and their relationship to it, some design meeting or something that stands out.

Love: I'm not very good at that.

Adamson: That's okay.

Love: There's a lot of little events where we ended up with good-natured fun being poked at us, a lot of times in the field where we'd done some bonehead thing, something that just didn't work out, that we realized we'd stepped in it, and they were going to let you stay in it for just long enough that you realized that you have some responsibility after all. But I don't know, maybe it was because of my stiff-neck German background that I always enjoy a good laugh, like everybody else, but I usually tried to be as businesslike as I could. Some of them may remember, "Oh, god, Art doesn't remember when he did this or did that." In our presentations, when I made a presentation, I was so keyed up and focused on it that I couldn't rehearse. See, that was my problem. I was a one-trick pony, and if there was any rehearsal, I had to be very, very careful, particularly if somebody said, "Let's hear what you're going to say," because I didn't operate that way.

My presentation was, "I'm going to take you on a tour of this building, and I'll tell you why it is, what it is, why it's sited the way it's sited, and we're going to go through this building together. When we get through, you're going to know what this building is and why it is." So there wasn't any script.

There were a couple presentations done at Pankow that I had to make because they insisted on pre-scripting, and I had a terrible time with it, because that's just not the way my mind operated. Fortunately, they let me do it. They'd go through, and I'd always fit, had a slot. There was a preamble and then there was a conclusion, and the conclusion was really heavy-duty Pankow, where they'd, in a sense, say, "Okay, now you've heard all the great story of what a wonderful building this is. Now let's roll up our sleeves and tell you what the business deal is going to be." But I appreciated the slot

they gave me, because it gave me a chance to show off and it gave me a chance to—I always felt that we had a key role because we were the people, we were the firm that they were presenting to the owner and so we had an obligation and space to hold up our end of the deal. If we came in and just—they would never present a building that was a bad building. Never. They would never allow it.

But if I came in and screwed up on the presentation and everybody ended up being confused and wondering, "What in the world did he just say?" then they had to dig themselves out of the hole. What I wanted to do was to get everybody so excited about the building that when it came time to do the business deal, they had this carryover from the building, so that they'd approach the business deal with no misgivings about if they could put the deal together, they knew the building was a building that they liked, hopefully. That was my key role in the game. I'm sure there was a lot of other key architects that worked with them that had the same feeling, that it was sort of an obligation which we had, I thought.

Adamson: Just for purposes of contrast, I guess, were you or a Welton Becket job that you're aware of where you got involved with a contractor or owner and the project just went over budget, went on and on and was something that was bad for your reputation or financially that you had to get out of or were stuck with?

Love: We never got out of a project, but the Grand Ole Opry Theater in Opryland, and it was, I guess, the nature of the beast, but it was way over budget, and we had to work very, very, hard. Again, this was George Hammond working incredibly hard with the

contractors, because there was a contractor on board, he was pricing it, and when it got down to the final strokes, we were way over budget. So without destroying the integrity of the facility, we managed to do this world-class TV broadcasting facility with all this audience, it was hard work, very hard work.

Usually that's the case, because what we found—and this is where Pankow was so important—a large percentage of the cost of a building is hidden. It's in the structure, in the mechanical system, and the electrical service. When you go over budget, what you end up attacking, usually, is about 10 percent of the cost of the building, which is in the finishes, because you've made mistakes in the decision-making process you picked, because you've asked an engineer and an architect operating somewhat together but really separate entities. There's been bad decisions made, and you're so far down the road you can't go back and redesign the structural system, but that's really what should happen.

Well, with Pankow that never happened, because from day one as they developed their thinking about how this building should be built, they knew intuitively or as a result of a lot of in-house analysis that they had that they could draw back on, that based on the conditions of this project, whatever it was, soil conditions, budget constraints, whatever, that it needed to head in this direction. So you didn't have all that built-in overage.

Adamson: Is there any aspect of your relationship with Pankow that I didn't ask you about, as a final catchall question? Christmas parties?

Love: I was going to say I was the victim of several long dinners in San Francisco and a couple other places that—

Adamson: While you were at the 3800 Washington or other—

Love: Just job meetings or things like that that just—I used to indulge myself a lot more in those years than I subsequently did or certainly do now. They were fun people to be with. My recollection is that when they finally turned off the lights at midnight or whatever it was, that then they could relax. I don't remember very many dinner meetings or lunch meetings. Well, lunch meetings sometimes were business because you were getting ready for something, but usually later everybody just relaxed and had a good time. As I said, they were good people, so you were friendly, so the relationships were not strained. We really felt very comfortable with those guys.

Adamson: Very good. I think we'll leave it right there.

Love: Okay. You got more out of me than I ever thought you could. I really do have, like a lot of people, I have limited memory of detail about a lot of that stuff until I start talking and then something happens and I begin to dredge up some things. Or given certain prompts, I can say, "Oh, yes, I remember all that now."

Adamson: That's great.

[End of interview]