

Oral History Interview

with

GEORGE F. HUTTON

September 10, 2009

Honolulu, Hawaii

By Michael R. Adamson

[Note: The interview took place at Mr. Hutton's residence, the penthouse of Craigside II, where he has lived since Charles Pankow Associates completed the 27-story condominium in 1982.]

Adamson: Let's get started. We'll start with your background, how you got into construction and how you ended up in California with Kiewit.

Hutton: I graduated University of Missouri in 1954 with a civil engineering degree. After that, went to work for Standard Oil Company of Whiting, Indiana, up in Whiting, Indiana. Worked up there for several months and then got drafted because everybody had to go in the Army at that time. Spent a couple years in the Army in the Corps of Engineers and the Military Intelligence Group there.

Then after I got out of the Army, I was about twenty-four, I believe, a little old to be getting out of the draft in the Army, but I'd taken a deferment all the way through college, and so your obligation did not go away, even though you got older. Today, I think the soldiers are a lot younger. But at any rate, when I got out, I'd been more or less

treading water for a couple years and went back to Standard Oil. When I got back there, I found that I was still treading water. It was like a government job.

While I'd been in the Army, there'd been a big fire at the refinery, and when I got out, they were building a new office building, and I got assigned to that office building, but as about a second- or third-tier Standard Oil engineer. They had a contractor on the job. He obviously had all the responsibility of building the project. He had the architect on the job, who had designed the project. They had my boss on the job, who was representing Standard Oil, and all he did was read the newspaper. And I'm working for him, which meant I had less to do.

I remember one day I had my hand behind my back like this and feet up on the desk, and I had been back out of the Army for about six months, and I dropped my feet off the desk and said, "I quit. I've had enough of this. I'm too young to retire."

My boss couldn't believe it. He said, "You got it made."

So any rate, I said, "I'm not quitting today, but I'm starting to hunt for another job, and I'm going to go to work for a contractor, because that's where the action is."

It took me a while, but I made a connection with one of the contractors who had done work for Standard Oil in the refinery, and in about, I think, August or September of 1958, I believe it was, I left Standard Oil and went to work for the contractor.

After a year or so working for him, he ran out of work, which wasn't too good a move on my part, making a move like that, but, anyway, it gave me an opportunity to really assume a lot of responsibility. And after that job was over with—

[recorder paused]

Adamson: The crux of the question is how you ended up with Kiewit in California.

Hutton: When I was in college, my senior year in college, first time I ever heard of Kiewit was [when] they came to town, to Columbia, to interview for engineers, and one of the jobs they had open was a job in Alaska. This friend of mine, George Thomas, and I went down, and he got the job. He got the job, and that's the way things go.

But when he came back that fall, he was extremely pleased with the Kiewit Company, and that's really the first time I became acquainted with the Kiewit Company. After I left Graver Construction Company [based in Joliet, Illinois, where Mr. Hutton had taken a job, and subsequently had been assigned to the construction of a chemical and pain manufacturing facility], my wife and I moved back to Kansas City. This was in 1958. I went to work for Franklin Construction Company, and my life had been a little bit of an "opportunity presents itself." Like I mentioned in that, I was applying for one job, and they said they were going to give me another one. "If you produce, why, you can keep it. If you don't, why, we will make a change." Well, that worked out fine.

But, as the same token, that contractor—well, I needed the job at that time because I was newly married, didn't have the characteristics of a job a really wanted. I wanted to work for a contractor who did pretty good-sized stuff, had an impeccable reputation and paid its bills on time and so forth, and Kiewit did all of that. They had an excellent reputation in the construction business and so forth.

Well, after I'd been back in Kansas City, where we'd moved to, for a year or so, why, I saw an ad in the paper advertising for Kiewit, and so I made the interview up in

Omaha and got along fine with a guy named Bob Nemo, who was the personnel manager, and after several months he wrote and told me that they were unsuccessful in the bidding process that they were planning on staffing the jobs for and, therefore, didn't have a job in that respect. But in the process of talking with him several times, he said he was going to send my résumé to Charles Pankow out in the West Coast, who was Building Division manager for Peter Kiewit & Sons Company in Los Angeles, and he did and told me that Charlie would be in touch.

Well, I talked with Charlie two or three times, but he was always on an airplane, always traveling, and the last time, again, fate happens. But the last time, I had just gone down to close out the job I'd been working on with this Quinlan [Frank Quinlan Construction Company], going to take another particular project, take another job, and I went home. Like I said, never in my life had I been home at ten o'clock in the morning, and I walk up to the door and start to open the door and the phone's ringing, and it's Charlie and he was in Kansas City at the airport. I told him, I said, "I'm right down to the nub and I need to make a decision on this," and he suggested that I fly out to Los Angeles that weekend and he'd meet me and we'd see what happened, and that he would pay the ticket.

So I did, and he met me at the airport with Doris, his wife, and we went out and met the rest of the guys, a number of the fellows, anyway, with the Building Division. Make a long story short, I took the job, or he offered me a job and I took it; had to pay my own way to California, though, had to pay my own move, which is all right, too. But that's how I hooked up with Kiewit.

I always worked for Charlie, and I found out that all of the persons in the Building Division worked for Charlie also. They really didn't consider themselves working for Kiewit, although obviously they did because, you know, the checks came from Kiewit. But he had a certain, I don't know, magnetism or something at that point in time that everybody just really busted their butt, and there was a lot of esprit de corps in the company, esprit de corps between jobs, a lot of cooperation between jobs. The personnel that ran that work, you've interviewed some of them, Alan Murk. Harold, well, you didn't. Harold Henderson passed away. There was a number of them passed away, Ralph Tice. But any rate, they all were heading in the same direction. There was no backbiting, no corporate infighting. Everybody cooperated and so forth, and, quite frankly, everybody was proud of the fact that they worked for Kiewit.

Kiewit gave them a blanket that—it was a security blanket, so to speak, because Kiewit had worked many, many, many, many years earning the reputation they did, they enjoyed, and it is a good one. So here's Charlie down there running this building division, scrambling, and not unlike what I experienced later on here, in fact, it's so similar I can't believe. But he was trying to establish his own identity or the identity of the building division within the framework of the Kiewit Company, and Peter Kiewit was not sympathetic with that. Peter Kiewit wanted to build missile bases and freeways and highways and things of that sort. And for some little building division that consisted of ten or fifteen mainline, supervisory personnel or so forth, that's pretty small stuff. I mean, building a Music Center, you know, things of that sort, big stuff. And here's Charlie down there trying to establish an identity for what he really wanted to do, which was build buildings.

He had this design/build concept that he had become familiar with, I guess several years before, and was really trying to promote this design/build concept, which, if you're familiar, I'm not going to go into detail on it, but it was a different approach than bidding work. It was where a contractor could really make a substantial contribution to the project and ultimately come out not feeling like you're just down there reacting, that we're causing a reaction.

So any rate, I worked on several jobs in San Diego, that's where it was, and worked for Alan Murk, worked for Bob Carlson, worked with Tony Giron, who you missed. He passed away a couple years ago or three years ago. Worked with Red Metcalf and some of the other guys you have probably already interviewed. But it was a real great experience. I just looked forward to going to work every day.

Adamson: Did the Building Division predate Charlie joining Kiewit?

Hutton: No. He somehow—and I'm not exactly sure on this, but he talked Tom Paul, who was the district manager, he talked Tom Paul into supporting him and letting him run a little bit. Tom Paul was always like a mentor to Charlie, I believe. Tom Paul helped him, I believe, in his relationship with Kiewit, because Charlie's relationship with Peter Kiewit, to the best of my knowledge, was not that great. I mean, Pete Kiewit was a real authoritarian. But you don't run a big company without having control, which goes back to another similarity on this whole thing between the Kiewit Building Division and the Peter Kiewit & Sons' Company and Charles Pankow Associates and Charles Pankow,

Inc., referring to Hawaii, Charles Pankow Associates Hawaii and Charles Pankow, Inc., which is the mainland and so on. It's a very similarity between the two.

Any rate, I worked out there from about 1960 through—I went out there about, I think it was, Thanksgiving 1960, and about the middle of '63, why, I heard that Charlie was thinking about quitting and forming his own company. I was working with Alan Murk on the Hillcrest Medical Center job, and he used to come by and pick me up every morning since I was on the way, and we'd ride to work. I remember when I first heard it, how disturbing it was because I'd worked a long time and I really felt like I'd found a home, and it wasn't a home with Kiewit, but it was a home with the building division.

So about that time I got sent out to build, as a superintendent, promoted, to work on this Rancho Bernardo [reservoir] project. Tony Giron went with me as a field superintendent. But we were out there not too terribly long, I can't remember exactly, maybe about a month or two, and I heard that Charlie had quit, and Bob Carlson had quit at the same time, and Ralph Tice had quit at the same time, and I don't know who else. I think it was primarily those three. Alan said he was going to go, but he said, "Don't be too upset, because Charlie's going to call you Sunday."

And he did. He called Sunday. I'd only really been out as a superintendent on this job, and this job, the job that he wanted to me go up there on, was everybody was going to be on it, Alan Murk and Ralph Tice—no, Ralph Tice wasn't. But Alan Murk and Harold Henderson and so forth. But he was really enthusiastic about the opportunities and so forth, and, like I say, I never really worked for Kiewit; I worked for Charlie. So when we got done with the conversation, he said, "I want you to be up in Oakland a week from Monday, a week from tomorrow."

And I said, "I'll be there."

So, anyway, I had to go back and quit Kiewit. I went back and said, "Friday's my last day." I got a week's leave. There was big turmoil in that company because there were other persons involved that were working on other jobs that didn't particularly have this opportunity.

Adamson: So you had to tell Tom Paul that you were quitting?

Hutton: Well, no, I don't know. I told—Russ Osterman was going to stay behind. They had him as a guinea pig, you know, and he was going to take over the building division, and he was supposed to keep the lid on everything, because Kiewit was talking about suing Charlie for proselyting [*sic*] help and so forth. It never materialized, but anyway.

But anyway, Russ got moved. When Charlie left and Bob left, Russ got moved up to head of the building division, and so I think I—I don't remember the conversation particularly, but I'm sure I told Russ that, "I'm leaving, too."

Adamson: Russ left how much longer than that?

Hutton: That was later. It was probably at least a couple months after that. Russ stayed around until everything got settled down a little bit. Then he left, too.

But I remember my wife, and I told her this, she said, "How much you going to get paid?"

I said, "Shit, I don't know. I forgot to ask." [laughs] True story.

But any rate, I went up there and we worked on this big job, 40,000 yards of concrete, big, big shopping center, complete redesign, post-tensioning, really quite a job.

Adamson: Did Charlie have this lined up before he quit?

Hutton: Essentially, yes. Essentially, or he had it—there wasn't any contract, but he had talked to the owners and so forth. So when we went up there, the job was there. I mean, he didn't get anybody coming out like that, because it was a hell of a payroll at that point in time. Minuscule compared to what it is today, but at that time everybody was well paid and you can't guys out there without having a job for them. Well, he lined that job up before he made that phone call, and before everybody left, he knew he that had that job. He quit and lined it up, and everybody left. You see what I mean, in other words.

But it was a real challenge, and it was on a fast-track basis. I mean, we were designing the project and we were going with everything in that project that was precast, we poured-in-place. Everything that was poured-in-place, we precast. I mean, the guy who designed the thing just had it ass-backwards, you know. He had monumental precast out there on a building going seven stories high, and how in the hell you get a crane to it is beyond me, so we poured-in-place. Then we had the other parts that were designed as poured-in-place, hell, why not precast it, and we did that. So it worked out very well.

I used to go to the structural engineer's office, T. Y. Lin's office, and I would literally get the work, the drawings for what we were going to do the next day. I mean, we were—well, it was a lot of fun.

Adamson: I have a couple questions before we go on with Pankow. Two things. I think you've kind of answered this, that Charlie had already developed this design/build approach while he was at Kiewit, but were buildings like the [Hillcrest] Medical Building you mentioned, the First & C building that Red Metcalf talked about working on, were those negotiated by Charlie?

Hutton: Yes. Yes, they were. First, the Hillcrest Medical Center was not. That was a bid job. We bid that. I remember going down and turning in the bid. I used to get the job when we were going to bid a job, and we bid occasionally because we didn't have the luxury of a big long history of doing design/build jobs. I mean, they were very new at that time, and so you had to keep the doors open. So every once in a while we had to selectively pick a job that had a friendly architect, a friendly structure engineer—I'm talking about somebody that Charlie knew personally and things like that—and had some room to maneuver as far as improving our position by construction methods or something like that.

So he would look for opportunities such as that. Sometimes we were successful in bidding the job, sometimes we weren't. In the case of the First & C Building, which was a twenty-four story building, not a thirty-story like Alan [Murk] said, but, anyway, it was designed as hard rock concrete, just regular concrete, hard rock concrete. Charlie said—he got with the structural engineer and [said] if we can change it to lightweight concrete, we can take many thousands of pounds of rebar out of it, the building will be lighter, and so forth and so on. But that was a bid job, too. I remember I turned in the bid on that damn job, you know, went out.

But we were able, after we got the job, to present to the owner a program whereby we could save him a substantial amount of money improving our position also or protecting our position maybe in that case more than improving it. I think it's probably protecting the profit that we had in the job that was probably a little tight at that time because you're bidding a job and maybe we can improve it a little bit. But, anyway, the job worked out fine, I mean as far as profitability is concerned.

So each one of those jobs that we would try to be selective, or Charlie would try to be selective, on what we're going to do so that we would protect ourselves, and they all consisted of working with people who were—and when I say friendly, I don't mean anybody's unfriendly. I just mean receptive to change. Some people are not. Some people are not receptive to suggestion by the contractor. “I am the architect. I am God.” “I am the structural engineer. I am God. What do you think you're telling us what to do? You're just a contractor.” Well, we don't do business with those guys, at least very often, if we can avoid it. [laughs]

Adamson: Red [Metcalf] also talked about slipforming on the First & C Building. I'm just wondering, was slipforming something that you guys were doing and not many others were doing? What was the state of slipforming when you guys were doing it?

Hutton: Well, slipforming had been around for a long time. You see grain silos and any of these round things you see out in the middle of prairies that are round and they're up 150 feet, something like that, those are generally all slipform. They're circular and they just move up. They're on jacks, and they just move up as you pour the concrete and

place the steel, and they just go up like that. Sometimes they go all the way, sometimes they go partway and so forth, but nobody, I believe, had ever—well, I shouldn't say that. It was uncommon to have that slipforming operation applied to a building, and at First & C, Charlie said, "Well, let's slipform the stairway." They're common all the way up, same configuration. And the elevator shafts and stairways and stairs that are associated with the elevator shaft, which makes a bigger chunk, but it goes up like that, too.

The configuration stays the same from the foundation, essentially, to the top. You might drop off something, but, I mean, essentially it stays the same. So he said, "We're going to slipform the stairways and elevator shafts in the building. Okay?" Well, that's a mouthful, particularly when you don't have anybody that has done it before, and you can't afford to fuck up. You can't, because too much is at stake. But we were able to pull it off and slipformed the building, at least the elevator shafts and stairwell.

Then on the Hillcrest Medical Center, we went up there and did the same thing up there. The center core was twenty-seven foot in diameter. I remember the dimensions, I don't know why, but twenty-seven-foot square, had elevator shafts and so forth in there. We mounted a tower crane in an electrical room, supported it on beams, and as we were went up one floor, one floor, we'd raise the crane, raise the crane, until we had the crane 127-foot up there, and, you know, great view, twenty-seven-foot-square building—I mean right there, and then we dropped the slabs from the top coming down. We formed them, dropped them down. That was kind of interesting. I don't think it was a big deal one way or the other, but nobody had done that, but we did it, Red and—down at First & C is when I first got acquainted with Red and first got acquainted with Bob Carlson.

Bob Carlson had one hell of a lot to do with my success over there. He was a real construction man, and he taught me things, not teaching as such, but I picked up things from him that, quite frankly, had contributed substantially to the success [of the Pankow company] over here. One thing in particular is making new people feel at home. In construction, you constantly move from one place to another, and people don't have any family there. Like when we moved to California, my wife's real tight with her family, and I was concerned about that, and yet, Thanksgiving or Christmas, Bob would say, "Hey, come on out to dinner. Come out and spend Christmas Day with us."

We were getting ready to slipform at First & C, and Nan and I were going to go back to Kansas City for a vacation, Christmas vacation, and the slipform operation which I was in charge of, and Red was working with me, was supposed to start right at that time. Bob said, "I just don't see how the hell you're going to go." So we didn't. Walked through the Mission Valley shopping center on New Year's Eve. What the hell are we going to do for—what do you want for Christmas? Because our trip was our Christmas. Then my son was born nine months later. [laughs] I always told Bob, "You're the fault of that." If we'd have gone back to Kansas City, why—

Adamson: A couple more things on Kiewit before. You mentioned the L.A. Music Center. You didn't work on that job?

Hutton: No. Bob did. Bob Carlson.

Adamson: It's my understanding that that was something Charlie didn't want to do but Peter Kiewit wanted to do because it was a high-profile job and, as Red [Metcalf] says, he thought that the Seattle people came down. I don't know the whole story.

Hutton: What happened was, they bid the job, and I don't know the background on how it was bid or anything, but Kiewit bid the job and was low bidder on the job, something like \$23 million or something like that, which is insignificant today, I mean, you know. It would probably be \$223 million today.

I remember now. Charlie was arguing about not doing it because we didn't have the manpower, and Pete told him, "We don't need your manpower. We can staff it ourselves. We don't need the building division to help us out on this thing here." So they sent down a bunch of guys from—freeway builders and things of that sort—down from the Northwest District, the Seattle District. Well, building a freeway or whatever, an overpass or whatever like that is a hell of a lot different than building a Music Center, which was a pretty elaborate building in itself.

After it got a ways a long, it was behind schedule and behind costs and so forth, and I'm trying to remember the guys who Charlie put—they finally called for help, and the guy that—I don't know who they put up there, I can't remember the guy's name, but Bob Carlson went up there, too, and Tony Giron went up there and Jack Grieger, I believe, was up there. Gravity kind of sucks everything toward it, but the job got built.

I remember this—this is another thing I learned. When Bob went up there, they said, "Stop the job. Stop it. We're going to clean this son of a bitch up," because it didn't look like a Kiewit job. A Kiewit job is an organized job and so forth, and you

don't have a bunch of trash and stuff. So they spent a day or two just with the labor force, just cleaning the job up. Now, that's only good for the first time, because you've got to follow through and because you can have a job spic and span, and two days later it will look like a pigpen if you don't have the discipline on the job to have an active program that will keep it that way on a continuing basis. But psychologically, that's the first step, and so they did. The job got started again, and I'm not saying it went smoothly, perfectly, by any means, but I didn't have any particular experience with it other than I got to go up there one time and got a tour of it one time when we things were a little bit slack down in San Diego. But, yeah, they were going to man it with the freeway builders, and it didn't work out.

Adamson: Now, is there a moment that Charlie decided he'd had it and he wanted to form his own company, or is this something that he was thinking about for a long time?

Hutton: I don't know. I wasn't privy to his thoughts at that time, but I think that probably, I would say, it was about six months, I'm guessing, because I remember Bob Carlson talking about that. They had been to a meeting back in Omaha, a management meeting, with higher management, higher than I was, and certainly that's the truth at that time, and Pete [Kiewit] had really treated Charlie badly in that meeting, I mean talked disparagingly about the operation or something to that effect.

Bob told me later that—and I believe Ralph Tice might have been there, too, but anyway, I know Bob was there, and Russ, Russ Osterman. They were having drinks afterwards talking about, "Maybe I ought to leave this goddamn company," and that

would have been roughly six months before that actually happened, like in the wintertime. We had the meetings in the wintertime, you know, January, February, when nobody else was back in Omaha. It's terrible. I was back there one time, and, Jesus, it was ten below or whatever, in the dead of winter, they had one of those meetings.

Anyway, he left, I believe, in the summer of 1963, yes. So I would say he thought about it for several months.

Adamson: I've been going through the transcripts and reading what people have said about Charlie as a personality and that, and I've also read some stuff on Peter Kiewit and some of the things that Kiewit had said, and setting aside their differences, there seems one of the things that Peter Kiewit used to say, and they still quote him is, "He didn't want to be the biggest, but he wanted to be the best." And as I look at some of the things that people said about Charlie, it looks like he took a lot of the Kiewit culture with him.

Hutton: Oh, you can't help but do that. You try to pick the good things that are there and try to leave behind the bad things. There aren't too many bad things that I can really say about the Kiewit Company. I don't know of anything really, quite frankly, that sticks in my mind that I would feel justified criticizing, because I sure as hell never found that in my own experience.

I know that when we left and formed Charles Pankow Associates at that time, that's what the first job was done under, the name Charles Pankow Associates. Later on Charlie Pankow Associates would just refer to Hawaii. But the cost reports looked the same, the forms looked the same, all this stuff looked the same because you just take

them, you reproduce them, you got to have them, and why go out and try to reinvent the wheel?. And you're not stealing anything that's other than a blank piece of paper. Or taking. I shouldn't even say stealing, because it's not, I mean, taking anything but blank sheets of papers. But, yeah, he would take the good things.

Adamson: Was Charlie's idea of employee ownership like Kiewit's or did he have his own ideas?

Hutton: No, no. Charlie, he very early on, very early on in—the company was started in September of 1963, and in about September of 1964 we had our first company meeting. There's only about, oh, hell, eight of us, something like that, Alan Murk and Ralph Tice and Ralph Van Cleave and myself and Tony [Giron] and Jack Grieger, I believe, and, I don't know.

Adamson: Russ.

Hutton: Russ. Russ was there by that time, because Russ came a couple of—you know, Russ was there. Lloyd Loetterle was a casualty, and from best I can determine, Charlie didn't want anybody—you can argue [with Charlie], but [at a certain point he would say] “This was it,” and Lloyd didn't see it like that. So when we went in that first meeting, “Hell, who's missing?” Everybody said, “Well, where's Lloyd?”

Then a little while later, Charlie came in and said, “Lloyd’s not going to be with us any longer. He decided he wanted to do something different.” Well, you know.

[laughs]

Adamson: Well, uncannily, was another thing I read about Pete Kiewit, was he would listen up to a point, but then, like you said, he was the authoritarian with the final decision.

Hutton: You didn’t see that character in Charlie very often, in that you did not see any—he was not a confrontational guy. He would never—it’s hard for me to remember a time when he was confrontational.

The first time I ever saw that was when we were finishing up the Broadway and MacArthur job, and we had a meeting with the owner, a guy by the name of Edmond Herrscher, and his staff, and we were trying to resolve some change orders. One of the guys from Sollitt Construction Company, which provided the bonding capacity for the company on its initial venture, was out there, and we went over to the meeting and it was a confrontational meeting. And partway through that meeting, Charlie stood up. He said, “I’m not staying around here any longer.” He told the guy from Sollitt, “You do what you want to on this goddamn thing,” and turned around and walked out. And I tell you, I would never have done that. I mean, he’s the head of the goddamn company. And I’ve seen other times when it’s a confrontation, he backs away. He does not like eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations.

Adamson: The other thing about Peter Kiewit that struck me is, I think it was Bob Law said about Charlie was that as far as the people on the job, superintendents, as long as the job was running well, pretty much Charlie would let you go. And they said this about Peter Kiewit, if there was a problem or something wasn't going well, he would jump in and shorten the leash. I'm not sure if that is a parallel to Charlie at all, but when people talked about Charlie with the people on the job, as long as the job was going well, it's my understanding, that was roughly parallel to the way—

Hutton: You know, I never saw Charlie get involved in a job situation. He always would put the task to someone else. I mean, if there was something that he didn't like about First & C on the job, Bob Carlson knew about it. I mean, he would let it be known, but he would never circumvent Bob or anything like that.

One time Pete Kiewit came to the First & C job, and we were starting in the foundation, and the banks were steep and we were down about twenty-five, thirty feet. Not particularly comforting.

Adamson: If you're sitting in the bottom.

Hutton: Yeah. But, anyway, Pete came out one time and visited the job. I remember him saying to Bob, "You know, I don't like those banks." He said, "Do something about them." He didn't say what to do about them. After Pete left, we decided, there's only one thing we can do. Rebar's half in it. We aren't going to take the rebar out and do anything, Gunitite the wall or anything. But get the goddamn rebar in, pour the son of a

bitch, so that's what happened. We worked over the weekend, and I think about Monday or Tuesday we poured it, big pour. And lo and behold, the middle of the week, why, Pete Kiewit calls up and asks Bob, "What did you do about those banks?" from Omaha. Now, he's got a hell of a lot more jobs than that First & C job.

Bob said, "Oh, we got them poured. Everything's set. We worked overtime, got them poured."

"Good. Thank you. Fine."

Adamson: But that's something Charlie would never do?

Hutton: No.

Adamson: From that far?

Hutton: No.

Adamson: Now, the setup with the company, you mentioned eight people. Charlie was majority owner from day one or how was that?

Hutton: Oh yeah, he was majority owner from day one, and everybody—but he encouraged—one of the things that was intriguing about me in this thing was the opportunity to become a part of the company, to be a stockholder in the company. I had a lot of confidence in Charlie, I had a lot of confidence in the other people, and I felt that

we were going to be successful in the long haul. So at that first meeting, that first company meeting in 1963, he said that he was going to make stock available. I think it was a couple years. I think it was a year or so later before it actually happened, but at least that is what his philosophy was, was going to let everybody buy stock. Now, he's not going to let them buy if somebody happened to have a sugar daddy, he wasn't going to let them buy more than what he wants them to buy, but nobody had any money anyway, so he encouraged people to buy. He wasn't selling it now; he was just presenting it as an opportunity if you wanted to do so. He was not saying this was going to be a good deal or anything like that; he was just saying, "If you want to be a part owner of the company, let me know." But he made no promises as far as how successful we were going to be, because that's problematical.

Adamson: Where did Charlie get the money, capital, to start his own company?

Hutton: I don't know.

Adamson: Or didn't he have any?

Hutton: He didn't have much. I think that we didn't have enough money to bond that job. That's why we brought Sollitt Construction Company, and Sollitt had an association with his father. I think his father worked for Sollitt Construction Company back in South

Bend. In fact, I think Sollitt Construction Company built the Notre Dame Stadium back there. Not the same stadium it is now, obviously.¹

Adamson: The Knute Rockne one?

Hutton: Yeah. Yeah, I guess. I don't know.

Adamson: That's my understanding.

Hutton: Is it? Okay.

Adamson: The '29 one, 1929, 1930.

Hutton: Yeah. Yeah. You probably got some of that stuff that I don't remember.

But any rate, I remember I borrowed \$3600, because I didn't have any money. I borrowed \$3600 to buy the initial—I think it was thirty-six shares of stock at a hundred bucks a crack. [laughs]

Adamson: So all you guys who were down in Los Angeles came up to Oakland. Did anyone move up to Oakland?

¹ Ralph Sollitt & Sons Construction, South Bend, Indiana, was the company for which Charlie Pankow's father worked. Founded by Ralph Shannon Sollitt around 1920, the firm incorporated in Indiana as Sollitt Construction in April 1935. Sollitt's father, Ralph S. Sollitt, and grandfather, Thomas Sollitt, were successful general building contractors in Chicago. The South Bend-based Sollitt firm was a branch of the Chicago firm. It is no longer in business. The Chicago-based company, founded in 1838, continues doing business to this day (Charles Roll, *Indiana: One Hundred and Fifty Years of American Development*, vol. 3 [Chicago, 1931]; Sollitt Construction Co. Web site, URL: <http://www.sollitt.com>).

Hutton: Oh, yes, everybody moved up to Oakland.

Adamson: Or everyone was commuting?

Hutton: Oh, yes, we moved, lock, stock, and barrel.

Adamson: Family and everything?

Hutton: Family and everything.

Adamson: Then from there you went to Hawaii?

Hutton: Well, from there, Oakland—okay. I worked in Oakland from about September of '63 until '65, two years. It was a two-year job, a pretty long job, and in the meantime, I think Ralph Tice had built a building, a Post Office building or something, over in Colorado, and Harold Henderson had gone off and he ran the Turk & Eddy job, which was over in San Francisco, and there may have been one—but I was primarily concerned with Broadway MacArthur project. I wasn't concerned with about anything else.

In September, thereabouts, of '65, why, Charlie called me at the MacArthur job and said, "Go over to our office over in San Francisco on Green Street," wherever that is now, "and pick up a set of plans on the Campbell Building."

So I said okay and started takeoff on them. So I went over and picked them up and I didn't even look at them. I just brought them over and threw them on the plan table over at the job shack in our office over on the job.

The next morning, I unrolled them and I saw it said "Honolulu, Hawaii," and I thought, "Oh, shit, this is an exercise in futility." I mean, what the hell we thinking about doing over there to do anything?

So, anyway, I started takeoff on it, and, like I said, it was just like getting caught in a giant maelstrom, you know, it goes around and around and it keeps getting closer and closer and closer to the center, till you get sucked down the middle. But I made a couple of trips over here to Honolulu in the fall of '65, and ended up moving over here December 1, 1965.

Adamson: How did that job come about? How did Charlie get that job?

Hutton: T. Y. Lin, who was a structural engineer on the Broadway MacArthur job, was the structural engineer on this job, and it was through Y. C. Yang that I believe we became, or Charlie became, acquainted with Leo Wou, which was the architect, and one thing led to another.

It was a bid job, though, and we bid the job and we were third bidder. But the job was over their budget, and so this was a salvage job. So we had to figure out a way, if we wanted the job, to change things around, and we did. We did a lot of precasting where they were poured-in-place before. It was all things that we do.

Then we ended up getting the job, and so then Charlie said, “Well, since you’re familiar with the job, why don’t you go over and build it.”

And I said, “All right.” I remember I wasn’t too confident at that time. I mean, you’re starting a—hell, it’s a new place. It’s just—2,500 miles away and so forth, and I had two kids at that time. One of them, my daughter, was just six months old, and my son was a couple years old, and so forth and so on.

But at any rate, I remember going over and seeing Alan Murk one evening and Alan was encouraging. He said, “You can do it, George. You can do it.” He didn’t have anything to lose by saying that. [laughter] So, okay. Okay.

So I came over here, and, boy, I tell you, that was a tough son of a bitch. No help. All you had was cottage carpenters, guys that built houses, didn’t have any high-rises downtown, no high rises, no experienced form carpenters. No help. I had no job engineer. We were just getting by, and that was a tough job.

Adamson: So none of the hotels that had been built before were on that scale either?

Hutton: Oh no, they weren’t even built. You look down there [points out window], every building you see down there was not there, everything, downtown, all was not there. It was tough, and couldn’t get any help. Construction was started, and there’s a lot of activity—because statehood had been in ’59, and this was ’65, only five years, and, hell, it takes a while to get things going, and there weren’t any carpenters in the hall, no help.

I remember I finally assembled a crew of about six or seven carpenters, five or six carpenters, to work on the job. The Japanese are sensitive. They're different. I mean, they're good people, but they're sensitive. Maybe they've become less sensitive over the years, but at that time they were sensitive. You don't cuss or anything like that, and I had this guy with me, Harvey Vocke, that we brought from the mainland, who was a tough-talking guy, but good-hearted and everything like that. But he, "Goddamn it," you know, all that kind of thing.

Adamson: Red [Metcalf] had mentioned him as being a Kiewit guy.

Hutton: Yes, he was a Kiewit guy. He had come from Kiewit. Any rate, I look out the job shack one day and all the guys are walking out. I thought, what the hell is going on? I walk out there, and I said, "Chick," happened to be the carpenter foreman. I said, "Where the hell are you going?"

He said, "Oh, I'm going to quit. We're going to quit."

I said, "Why are you going to quit?"

He said, "Oh, Harvey, he cusses at us."

I said, "Goddamn it, he doesn't mean anything by that."

"Yeah, but, you know, we're going to quit."

I said, "Tell you what." And he stands about a foot below me. I said, "If you're going to quit, you're going to have to whip me first." [laughter] Now, he knew that I didn't really literally mean that, but I made a point and I finally got them to go back to work. But it was hard.

Adamson: So then Charlie comes out at the end of this project?

Hutton: He comes down every couple months, and when he'd come out, I'd try to make him acquainted with the people we have. We'd go down to some Chinese restaurant downtown, Wo Fats or something like that, and have dinner down there with the carpenter foreman or the foreman, the labor foreman, and so forth. Gradually, gradually, gradually we fleshed out the organization, at least to get that job built.

It was a difficult job. Ralph Tice at that time, was kind of a general superintendent, and would come over, theoretically to help, to give me guidance and so forth because he had more experience than I did. I remember one time we had so much precast on that job to detail. I didn't have any engineer to detail it, and I detailed at nighttime, all day Saturdays and Sundays and that type thing. I told him, I said, "Hey, Ralph, goddamn, why don't you stick around over here this weekend and help me detail some of this precast? I'm really behind the eight ball on this stuff."

He said, "I didn't come over here to detail any goddamn precast." [laughter] So, anyway, he left and he didn't.

But one other time, the job was tough, and I don't remember exactly where, but I was complaining about I need some help, I need some help. So, anyway, we were driving down to the—Charlie used to stay at the Waikiki, which was down by the Ilikai, right the other side of the Ilikai. There's another big building there now, but at that time it was a low rise. We were driving down there. I was talking to him, and Ralph turned around. He was in the front seat, Charlie was driving, and Ralph turned around and said,

“Well, maybe, George, you aren’t trying hard enough.” About that time, we pulled up to a stop sign right there at the corner of Ala Moana and down there. When we pulled up and stopped, I just opened up the door and got out and said, “Goodnight,” and walked off, walked over and caught a taxi home. [laughter]

Next morning, why, Charlie called and said, “Hey, George, come on down, have breakfast with us.” He knew that I really got mad.

I said, “I don’t have enough time to come down and have any goddamn breakfast down there,” you know.” I was really mad, still.

“Now, now, come on. Come on down there. Jesus Christ,” you know, or whatever it was.

So, anyway, I went down there, and I think that precipitated them starting to look for some help down here. I was really serious about that, and we did. Tony Giron came over. He was a godsend. He was a help, because I’d worked with him for years, knew him. And we rustled up a crane operator that had been a crane operator, a guy by the name of Russ Cohee from San Diego when we were down at the First & C building. And they sent over Bob Crawford.

Adamson: “Big Daddy.”

Hutton: “Big Daddy.” Sent over Bob and so forth, but that helped out.

Adamson: Dean Stephan and you and others have retold this story about Charlie leaving you on the tarmac at the airport.

Hutton: Yeah.

Adamson: So I don't think we have to go through that again, but what was going through your mind at this point? What did you do in the next months or whatever to—

Hutton: Oh, I don't know. I knew that—well, the story, you know—

Adamson: Unless you want to recapitulate it in your words.

Hutton: Yes, yes, in a way. But at the same token, I think Charlie—I even said this.

[laughs] I don't know. I said [about Charlie's thinking], "Well, if he [George] succeeds, that's great. If he doesn't, well, we don't have to move him back."

Adamson: Just leave him there.

Hutton: And I don't know which is true. Maybe both, like I say, you know.

But what did I do? I knew that the idea was find work, find another job, and we didn't have an office. I rented a dinky little old office down on Kalakaua, still there, upstairs. I mean, it's still there, the building [the Hawaii Education building at 1649 Kalakaua]. You know, one thing led to another and I immediately—or not immediately, but over the time I've been over, I recognized the shortcomings of some of the competition, and I'd seen and heard the results of some of the big jobs they'd done,

particularly with this piss-poor workforce that was in existence at that particular time. Of course, it's changed now. So any rate, I just started knocking on doors, in a way, call up an architect if I'd try to find somebody that knew an architect or something like that, and I'd go try to meet with them somewhere. Didn't have a car. I had a pickup truck that was beat up. So I always would arrange to meet them somewhere where I didn't have to pick them up in a pickup truck that was used on the jobsite or something like that.

But one thing led to another, and Charlie gave us a lead [through K. Tim Yee of Kaiser Development Company] on this little Hawaii Kai office building, \$275,000 job, small job, but it was simple, done in six months, and through that, why, we—there's a job going, and then we got the Ward Plaza down at the corner, Ward Plaza and down by Ala Moana, down by the fish market down there.²

Adamson: Who was the developer on that?

Hutton: That was Ward Estate, and that was through an architect, a guy by the name of Don Cutting, that I had gotten to know, and we turned in a price on it, \$1,415,000. I remember those numbers.

Then I come to find out a couple weeks later, why, Ward Estate is shopping the job, taking our number and going to Swinerton Walberg, who was one of our theoretical competitors, theoretical because we didn't really bid the same.

² Hawaii Kai was the focus of much of the attention of Henry J. Kaiser in his last years. Kaiser, who died in 1967, became involved in hotel construction and the promotion of tourism in Hawaii in 1954. In 1961 he signed an agreement with the Bishop Estate to develop 6,000 acres of land in the Kuapa Pond area near Koko Head. Kaiser envisioned a city of 75,000 of mostly middle-class white "foreigners," or *haole*. See, Mark S. Foster, *Henry J. Kaiser: Builder in the Modern American West* (Austin, Tex., 1989), chap.15.

But as soon as I heard that, why, I called Don Cutting up. I said, “Count us out. Tell Ed Hustace [the manager with Ward Estate] that that number is no longer good. We’re withdrawing that number.”

So he did, and then a period of time later, why, he called, and I guess Ed didn’t get the answer he wanted from Swinerton, so he called up and he said, “Ed Hustace wants you to reconsider.”

I said, “Well, if Ed Hustace wants me to reconsider, why, you have him call me.”

So, anyway, I knew that’s what Charlie would—you can’t negotiate against yourself. In other words, you can’t have a price out there and everybody take potshots at it, and then if you happen to be still there, why, it’s not going to work. So any rate, we ended up building that job, and that was a good job.

Then he got another job through Charlie and several of the first jobs were through Charlie’s acquaintances here, like Stan Froid and Lou Riggs, which were the engineers, Tudor Engineering in San Francisco. They were the engineers on the BART project, and they built a condo down here, or were going to build a condo. Well, we ended up building that job for them.³

Adamson: Which job was that?

³ Tudor Engineering was founded in San Francisco in 1950 by Ralph A. Tudor. A heavy construction firm that cut its teeth on long-span bridges, highways, and dams, the company formed a joint venture in the early 1960s with Bechtel and Parsons-Brinkerhoff to design and construct the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system. (From the description found in the finding aid to the Tudor Engineering Company Records, 1933–2006, BANC MSS 2007/134, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.) Riggs was president of the company. Froid was vice president.

Hutton: 250 Ohua. We built that job for them. But the fact, you know, you can only carry that communication so far. Then it has to start feeding itself. It has to start generating on its own, in other words. In the list of jobs we have here [points to list], maybe the first five or six, there was a pretty much a lead given, but I would follow through on that lead and so forth. But starting about 1971 or something like that, all those jobs were self-generated. I don't mean self-generated, but I mean they were not primarily generated from the mainland; they were generated from over here. Number one, 2,500 miles away, and if you don't have any follow-through here, why, you're not going to get it.

Adamson: Did any of the early projects result in repeat business, or when did you start developing repeat customers, as it were?

Hutton: Well, I think we started early on developing repeat customers, like Oceanic Properties. The first development project we did was Kaimana Lanais, which is down on Waikiki. It's about a twenty-two-story building or something like that. Bill Curlett was with Oceanic Properties, and he was a partner in that. They were getting the wrong answer on the construction and so forth, and they weren't getting it built. So we were able to bring that job together, and through Bill Curlett we did the Esplanade on Hawaii Kai, and through Bill Curlett we did Pearl One, and through Bill Curlett we did Pearl Two. So there's four jobs right there that came from some personal connection.

Then we did with Wally Sanger and Pete Smith and Bob Gerell and those guys, we did three or four jobs with them.

Adamson: So by this point, you're pretty much self-sustaining the business?

Hutton: Oh, yeah, yeah, starting about '71 or something like that, we were pretty much self-sustaining as far as business. Oh, hell, if Charlie had a good lead, shit, I wouldn't turn it down. You know what I mean. I was going to utilize that and so forth.

Adamson: So did Charlie ever have any—I guess he didn't, but did he ever define his expectations for the business out here or he just took what came?

Hutton: Whatever came. And it was substantial. It was substantial. In fact, about 1984 or '85, when I was having trouble with him, god, I couldn't figure out what the hell's he trying to kill the goose that laid the golden—you know? I went back and I found out that if you'd take all the profit that was made from Hawaii for the first fifteen years or something like that, and took it away, the company was worth zero. In other words, they paid their overhead up there, but all the profit that was generated was generated from Hawaii.

Adamson: Some of those Winmar jobs and things that were done was—

Hutton: They were good jobs, but they went to pay overhead. And I couldn't figure out. I used to lay awake nights, wondering what the hell is going on? What is his reasoning?

What is his—I don't understand it. Instead of getting support, it was like throwing roadblocks in front of us.

Adamson: That's '84, '85, is when the reorganization was developing.

Hutton: Yes. Yes, his reorganization. In fact, I talked to Rick James. He's an attorney here. Back in about '84, '85, I said—Charlie asked Rick to do some substantial accounting and work and other legal work for him. And Rick, they spent about ninety-grand on this, and the answer did not come out what Charlie wanted, and he didn't pay him. Didn't pay him. That can be verified. They had to suck ninety-grand, they just sucked ninety-grand. He said, "I'm not paying you. I'm not paying you. Goddamn it." He didn't tell them that. I mean, he would never tell them. He said, "I'm the one's in charge of the company here." So, shit, you got to do what you want, but he's not going to pay you.

Adamson: So did they sue him?

Hutton: No. No, because, hell, they're doing all the work. They didn't sue him because of me. They were doing all of our work here, you know?

Adamson: Oh, okay. I get it.

Hutton: They didn't sue him because—they would have if it had been a standalone deal, but they were doing all of our contract work and stuff like that that we had to do, and so they didn't do it.

Adamson: Did you do your own estimating on those early jobs? When did Dick Ackerson come on?

Hutton: He came out in 1970, he and his wife, Jan. He had been working for a contractor back in Minnesota, if I'm not mistaken. That's where he's from, anyway. He came out, and for the first couple jobs or so, he worked on the job as an engineer on the job. I don't remember exactly when I made him our estimator. Probably sometime in the mid-seventies, I think. I'm not positive about that. I don't recall. But we hired him.

We had a good group of people at that time, had hired Bill Heine in about '72, and hired Bill Deuchar in about '75 or '76, something like that, and then I got Red [Metcalf] over here, which was when we were down at Ward Plaza. Let me think now. Yeah. I made contact with him. I didn't keep in touch with him, but we'd always been good friends.

I called Bob Carlson one time because Bob was working in the Altadena office. I called Bob and said, "Where's Red working? I want you to find out where he's working, but I don't want you to call him. I want to call him." And Bob did that.

I called Red and I said, "You're working out in the [San Fernando] Valley for Kiewit still." He was superintendent for Kiewit, and I told him, I said, "Why don't you

come over here and take a look at the situation over here. I really need some help, and I think you'd fit in perfectly, and bring your wife."

So he did, and he came over here, and, lo and behold, I was able to talk him into it. I said, "How they treating you over there?"

He said, "Good, but nobody really looks out for me."

I said, "Well, goddamn it, Red, if you come over here, I'll look out for you." And I was able to get him to come over, and it was a long, good relationship.

Adamson: These FHA coop projects that you mentioned, how did they come about?

Hutton: I met a guy named David Cheng, C-h-e-n-g. His wife is a painter. She's a very famous painter here in town. He's dead now, but he wasn't much older. He came from Indonesia and she did too. No, she was over here. She was in New York. But any rate, he came over here and got involved with the HCHA, which is Hawaii Council for Housing Action, and he was kind of a consultant. At that point in time, the government was putting out these FHA 236 projects. They're subsidized housing.

So we had Leo Wou, who was the architect on the Campbell Building, was the architect on this one project, and Leo and I, although we had a tumultuous relationship, we had mutual respect, pretty much. [laughs] But any rate, David was a consultant, and Alvin Pang was the director of FHA, and we were able to negotiate that job.

Alvin said he had to cost-certify. These FHA projects were just like any government goddamn project, you know, the better you do, the less you get. So what the object is, to just build the job, and there's no incentive under the original thing. There's

no incentive. If the budget will allow five million dollars, if you spend five million dollars, that's fine. If you spend four and a half million dollars, no more goes in your pocket. Less goes in your pocket because you're cost-certifying and you're getting a percentage of whatever this thing is.

Charlie said, "We've got to have a lump-sum contract." Okay.

So I told Alvin, I said, "Okay, hey, look, we've got to have a lump-sum contract on this."

He said, "We don't do lump-sum contracts," and we had several discussions about that. Finally, no lump-sum.

I told Alvin, "No lump-sum contract, no contract. We're not going to do it, go out there, bust our ass, and do a good job and get paid less money. We're going to do it. If the budget says this, we're going to do it. We'll take the contract for that amount, but if we can beat it, how in the hell do you think I get these guys to bust their ass? They're not going to go out there if it's a cost-plus. They're going to go out there and dilly-dally. I mean, psychologically it's not the same."

Well, anyway, Alvin folded. He said, "Okay."

Adamson: So you got the FHA to—

Hutton: We got the lump-sum contract and we were able to extrapolate that into—so we did one, two more down there at Kauluwela. We did two more under that, and then one as the builder sponsor, because these were all done as builder sponsor. Happened to be the first three jobs were nonprofit jobs, and that was a sponsor. Then we did one on our

own up in Wahiwa, 236 up there, so we did four jobs off that one, and then they killed the program.

Adamson: So that was that.

Hutton: That terminated that.

Adamson: So were you doing almost all the jobs here on a design/build basis or was there a different sort of approach on some of these things?

Hutton: Well, they were all different, all different kinds. There were salvage jobs. There were development jobs. There were lump-sum-contract jobs. There was a mesh of the— there was all different. So there's not a way you can really say.

Adamson: You mentioned Leo Wou [and I was talking about] Norm Lacayo. I was just wondering if you could just talk generally about working with architects out here.

Hutton: I said earlier on that you can't work with everybody. Leo Wou was marginal. I mean, he was really marginal. We did several jobs with him. We did the Campbell Building. We did the Hilo Mall. We did the J.C. Penney store over there. We did the Esplanade. We did the Wahiawa project, the one I just referred, the 236 project. That was 236, that was Leo Wou.

But everybody has to be tuned in. Some people, there's just no point in it. I had a job one time for a developer here, Bruce Stark. He did those two buildings right in the center there [points out window to downtown skyline], he did those. I had an agreement with him to build a building, Canterbury [Place], down in Waikiki.⁴ I didn't have a signed contract, but, I mean, he had an architect. I have a tendency to tear them out of my brain and throw them away if they're bad. But we went into the meeting and it was apparent that we were wasting our goddamn time. That architect is not going to take any goddamn thing we say and use it, no matter what. He just doesn't want to hear it from me. "I'm the architect."

I remember going down and seeing Bruce, said, "Bruce, can't help you out on this thing here. We'd like to, but I'm going to pass because it's going to cause you a lot of grief, cause me a lot of grief. There's no point in pursuing a dead-end street," something like that. And I've done that several times, after I get into a job and find out it's not going to work. It's like trying to drive a square peg in a round hole.

Adamson: When you were doing the development, say, Honolulu Park Place or Honolulu Tower, how did you determine how many units the building would be? How did you determine the market before you brought in the architect?

Hutton: For instance, in Honolulu Tower, Ralph Cornuelle. Yes, we always hired somebody that had experience in that. I'm not professing to be a genius at developing. I

⁴ Bruce C. Stark was one of Hawaii's most prolific developers of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. His projects include One Main Plaza, One Waterfront Towers, and the Waikiki Trade Center. Canterbury Place contains 152 luxury units. It was completed in 1977.

mean, like I said, I have a sign on the wall over there that says “Remember, George, you’re a contractor.” Well, that’s fine. That serves good stead.

But like on the Honolulu Tower, a fellow by the name of Ralph Cornuelle was our development manager on that, and we hired him and paid him a fee, and I think he probably got a little bit of the action on that thing. On Honolulu Park Place, a guy by the name of Rick Rainalter did the same thing. He took care of all the permits and devoted his full-time to doing—but I had other things to do. I had four or five jobs here running and whatever it is, and I didn’t want to be tied down to that one job. It would have been a disservice. So we’d try to hire somebody that is knowledgeable and has a track record in the industry and so forth, and Rick and Ralph both did. Ralph was our partner on the Princeville project, over in Princeville.

Adamson: The Cliffs.

Hutton: The Cliffs, yeah. He was our partner over there. That was more or less a salvage job because the architect and Ralph, the architect, a guy by the name of Art Hanson, and Ralph couldn’t get it all together, they needed some strength, and we came in, ended up with 60 percent of the project and a lump-sum construction contract on the thing, made out fine. They were happy, too, because the job went, and they were in no position to say no on that thing.

Wilder Piikoi down there, same way. That was a salvage job. Kaimana Lanais down in Waikiki was the same way. The Hobron and the Mandarin, same thing in different fashions and there may be different—but they’re basically finding a need and

fill it. Why won't this job go? It needs this. Well, can we do that? Can we figure out a way to make that happen? And generally you can. I mean, batting average is pretty high.

Exec [Executive] Centre downtown. Hell, Charlie and I were partners in that damn deal, and we sacrificed the development profit, but the construction profit, every time the cash registers would go up like this.

Adamson: Al Fink mentioned on, I think, the Waikiki Landmark going through and reducing his costs. I'm just wondering if, on your developments, would you be the one who would look at the architect's rendering and the size of the units and all that? Would you be the one working with the architect on that, or was that just something that—

Hutton: No, no, we'd do something like that, but, for instance, on Landmark, we were the contractor. We had nothing to do with the development. C. Itoh, ITOCHU, was our partner in Honolulu Park Place down there, and I used to go to Japan every once in a while. They were our partner down there, and the job was very successful.

I was over to Tokyo one time and I heard they were talking about Landmark, and I said, "Who in the hell is going to build Landmark?" Ask a dumb question and you sometimes [unclear].

They said, "Oh, we're talking to Pacific."

I said, "What the hell do you mean? I mean, what the hell do you mean you're talking to Pacific? I just gave you ten million dollars last week as your part of the profit on Honolulu Park Place, and what the hell? Isn't there any goddamn loyalty in this

program?” You know, that’s the way I talked to them. [laughs] So we ended up getting the job.

Adamson: So when you’re the developer, though, you have an idea of the materials and all. Did you interact with the architect, or did you kind of let the architect go with the market?

Hutton: No, no, no. We interacted. It’s a design/build contract, only with a second—it’s even more of a design/build contract probably, but because you’ve got to make sure that the—if you have a design/build contract and you’re billing it for an owner, he don’t really give a shit what happens to it after you get done with it. I mean, you do, but let’s face it, economically you really don’t have any economic commitment to the job other than build it for a certain price. If you’re going to do a development, you have to build it for a certain price, but you’ve got to sell it, too. So you have the added responsibility of putting the package together that will sell. You’ve got to discipline. You have to select your sales force. You have to arrange the financing. Generally speaking, under design/build it’ll be arranged separately on that. Sometimes it’s not, but generally it would be.

So Charlie used to give me hell for, say, “We’re interested in doing design/build.”

I’d say, “What the hell do you think we’re doing?” I mean, we’re carrying it one step further than what a pure design/build contract will be. I don’t think we ever came to agreement on that, you know, although it worked for him when he wanted to do a development, like San Jose Plaza or something like that. But he didn’t do it himself and

Russ didn't do it himself. Now, they had input into it, certainly, but they would try to hire the people that are most knowledgeable about the best product that's going to sell at the end of the deal in a case like that.

I can't remember the names of them, but there are several of them, developments on the mainland, that the company was involved in, that were no different than over here, really, basically. They might have been office buildings. I think there were more office buildings over there, although there's a redevelopment down in San Francisco. There's a building down there. It was a condo.

Adamson: Are they Yerba Buena?

Hutton: Yes, Yerba Buena or somewhere down there. Can't remember the name of it.

Adamson: They did the office building in Eugene.

Hutton: Yes.

Adamson: So was there a job that you would say put Pankow in Hawaii on the map? I mean, could you point to a project and say, "This has made our reputation or made a statement that this is us?"

Hutton: You know, I don't believe that projects are capable of making a statement. I think the people who run the projects are capable of making the statement. I remember

distinctly that Howard Hamamoto, who's a good friend of mine and he was our partner, Amfac was our partner on this project [Craigsides II] and the one next door [Craigsides I]. And we did another job or two for him down in Mā'ili and that area down there, and I got to know him. He financed Pete Smith and Bob Gerell, so there's an interrelation of all things around in Hawaii. You just walk down the street, it would be interesting, say, "Hi, Bill. Hi, Sam, how you doing anyway?" And so forth and so on like that.

But the people make the statement. When we were down in Mā'ili on a project down there, Jack Parker, who is a young carpenter, said that I hired him. He used to work for Kiewit. I'd hired him. He came over here to be on vacation, and I hired him and at twenty-four made him a carpenter foreman. At twenty-seven I made him a superintendent on a project down there.

The job was looking good, and one day I was out with Howard Hamamoto and his people. I was taking them on a tour of the job. We were up about twenty floors or so, something like that, and the job was looking good and clean and moving up on a three-day cycle and so forth and so on. Howard said, "George, how in the hell do you get these guys to bust their ass and do all this good stuff?"

I said, "Hell, that's simple, Art. I let them keep their job."

And old Jack's about as far as you from here [gestures] and he bursts out laughing. He didn't have any problem with that. He didn't have any problem with that. He had self-confidence and so forth.

So buildings don't make the statement. The people who represent the company make the statement. They're the ones that deserve the credit.

Adamson: Fair enough. When you get up and running, say, in the seventies, did you ever do any top-down strategic planning, or did you just let the projects take care of themselves in terms of building the business? Did you ever step back and think, “I want to be here in five years”?

Hutton: I don't think so. No, I don't recall. Because the construction business is too cyclical.

Adamson: There's too many outside forces?

Hutton: Too many outside forces. You can't plan. You can react or you can plan ahead if you see a boom coming, but that's only for a relatively short period of time, couple years. So, no, I didn't.

Adamson: The context of my question is what people have said about Charlie's criteria for jobs. I'm just wondering if out here in a down period, did you consider, did you ever do a job just to keep people employed, or wasn't that an issue?

Hutton: Never, never was an issue out here. Never was an issue. Just to keep a person employed, no. I think you have to use that as an opportunity to upgrade. If you're building an organization, you hire a lot of people and sometimes you make mistakes in hiring the people. I said once that that's not the mistake. The mistake is not hiring them to start with; the mistake is not firing them when you know they need to be fired. And I

don't mean to be callous when I say "fired," or "let go." You can change [the term], the end result's the same.

So when work slowed down somewhat, you use that to upgrade or to weed out, and I always found that the way the company was over here, we didn't need to weed out the company. The company weeded out, the superintendents and so forth. I've probably fired a half dozen people in my life, because they're always fired before I ever get there. Those guys out there were smart enough to understand. And this goes clear up to superintendent level. There was a guy was an "I" guy. He used to say, "I did this, I did that, I did that." Shit, I knew the guy wouldn't last, but at that point in time we needed—he was doing an adequate job. But when the chips were down, why, he was the first one to go, and not because I let him go, because he just didn't feel comfortable. He just didn't feel comfortable.

Adamson: You did a lot of condos out here. From some of the offsite managers' meetings agendas and even the annual meetings, they talked about lawsuits or potential lawsuits, that lawsuits or litigation was a worry of Charlie's. I'm just wondering out here what your experience might have been with possible litigation or actual litigation.

Hutton: We had very few lawsuits. We've had several, though, but generally they're—

Adamson: A leak in the parking garage or something like that?

Hutton: No, no we fix those. No, we never have anything like that. I mean, that's one of the things that these guys would say. The owners would say they don't worry about that shit. I said, "Hell, if I say I'm going to fix it, I'm going to fix it."

They said, "Well, that's one thing." I always took contracts like this [demonstrates with sheet of paper] and I execute the damn thing and they'd execute it, and then we'd go over and put it in the goddamn file cabinet and never see it again. Everybody knew what they were supposed to do and you do it. You don't have to have a piece of paper to tell you that you've got to go out and fix this goddamn leak somewhere.

Adamson: That brings me up to about the middle eighties. I know we talked about this offline, but I just want you to recapitulate again how you thought that—you ran the Hawaii operation independently, and part of the reason for that was the lack of fax machines and that sort of thing. If you can, elaborate what you meant by that.

Hutton: Well, it's just that there wasn't any communication, and the communication was difficult. I learned early on that if I waited for instructions [from Charlie], I'd wait a long goddamn time and I'd probably fail. I don't think I ever really thought of it like that, because I'm kind of an aggressive person anyway, I mean, in that sense. But I think the distance was a distinct advantage, because if I'd have stayed on the mainland, I'd have never had the opportunity to do this. I would never had the opportunity to do this. I was able to create a company over here with the help of a lot of guys, but they wanted it.

I refer back to the Kiewit. They wanted an identity here, the same as Charlie wanted an identity for his organization when he was with Kiewit. He wanted that identity

and he had to have it. I mean, it was a necessary ingredient for success. I think the [guys wearing] Aloha jackets was a perfect example of building esprit de corps.

Adamson: At the annual meeting?

Hutton: Yeah. And I think flying the American flag off of the buildings down here was a perfect example. There's a flag flying up on top of this building right now, ten foot by twelve foot American flag up here. And I've never heard anybody complain about it. When we started doing those type of things, the esprit de corps, and that, now, set the identity. When you asked about identity a while ago, one project, no, one project didn't set that, but I tell you, I've been to—"Oh, you're the company that flies the American flags on top their cranes. Oh, yeah, we know that." Letters that say, "Condominiums, bah. The flag, hurrah." And the letters from some retired guy that says, "You know, I look out every night and I see that flag." So that's the identity that sets you apart from—that and the people that represent you, because if you're represented by the people whose performance is like this, it's not long before people know this.

Adamson: In the context of offices that didn't happen or started out and didn't succeed, like San Diego, or efforts in other places to establish offices, what would you say generally it takes to establish an office like you established in Hawaii and why were some of these other attempts to establish other offices not so successful?

Hutton: Distance from CJP [Charlie Pankow].

Adamson: And that's why Seattle and San Diego?

Hutton: Too close.

Adamson: Too close. And even San Francisco, even though there was an office.

Hutton: That and the wrong personality, because Charlie is a great guy to give what I call "march over the cliff" orders, you know, do something that—and the people, like Brad [Inman], for instance, or somebody, generally don't have enough either self-confidence or gumption, or whatever you want to call it, to move on their own. They're waiting for him, and he doesn't do it. That's, I think, Brad, waiting for Charlie and never got anything done on his own, and when Charlie'd tell him to do something, he took it, would take it literally, to a fault. There are probably individuals up there, maybe—who's the president?

Adamson: Rik [Kunnath].

Hutton: Rik, yes. God, yes. Brain failure. Rik, probably he's more a political animal. At least that's what—and if I speak out of turn—but he could function in that arena. He could function adjacent to Charlie. Now, I don't know anything about the company from 1991 on, so how that worked out, I don't really know. But I know there's some good people up there, really, really topnotch people, Tom Verti and those guys like that. I'm

not familiar with all the engineers now, but they have some really good people, and I think that somebody separated themselves from the others, like Rik did, evidently.

Adamson: Rik told me that soon after Brad got sent out here [that is, to Hawaii], I think it was Russ [Osterman] and maybe Dean Stephan was there, too, but they pulled him aside and they said, “Now that you’re running San Francisco here, Charlie is going to tell you a lot of things, but if you try to follow everything he says, you’re going to fail because they’re contradictory and you can’t achieve them.” He said that Russ thought that maybe even Charlie didn’t expect you to actually—

Hutton: I don’t think so either.

Adamson: That he expected you to have some interpretation of that and succeed.

Hutton: He said, “Goddamn it, I don’t want a goddamn job less than 15 percent,” you know.

Adamson: Right. I’ve heard that.

Hutton: I said, “Oh, bullshit. Will you take one 14 percent?” [laughs] You know, that kind of thing. No, I think that’s true. I think what you just said or whatever whoever said that. You know, for years I thought that there was some problem between Dean [Stephan] and myself.

Adamson: You mean how you were working in the organization?

Hutton: Yes. I thought that, “Hey, who’s out to get Hawaii?” Hell, I’m not intending to move back to the mainland and so forth. I don’t want to go back there in that goddamn thing. Hell, now I know it’s Charlie. That was fermented just like—

Adamson: Brad?

Hutton: No, the guy in charge.

Adamson: Rik.

Hutton: Rik. Goddamn it, I don’t know why I have a problem remembering his name, but he said, yeah, they played both ends against the middle and tried to pit people against other people.

Adamson: To what end?

Hutton: To what end? To what end?

Adamson: No idea why?

Hutton: To what end? To what end? Well, it's no different than me trying to figure out why the hell he's trying to torpedo the goddamn organization. Why in the hell every time I'd send a good man up there, the guy would work for him five or six years, he fires him. Six months later, he's gone. Dick Ackerson worked for us for fifteen years, fifteen years. Sent him up there, gone. Bill Heine gets up there three years and he's up there three weeks, and he says, "Screw it, man, I'm leaving. I'm not going to come up here."

Adamson: To San Francisco?

Hutton: No, to Altadena.

Adamson: Is that when he decided to go off on his own?

Hutton: Yeah. And Bob Hewitt, who's a controller. Jim Allyn, the controller. Bob Carlson, he leaves.

Adamson: He was on the mainland a long time.

Hutton: Oh yeah, he was on the mainland a long time.

Adamson: He left before or after the reorganization?

Hutton: Oh no, he left long before that. Well, not long. He left twice. When he came out here that time when Charlie showed up out here with Russ [Osterman] and so forth, and I said, “What are you out here for?”

“Well, you know, you need some help.”

I said, “Shit, if you’re out here to fire me, you don’t have to beat around the goddamn bush.”

“No, no, no, no, no.” And so he said, “I’m going to assign Bob out here.”

Well, Bob and I are good friends. I mean, he’s a great man. I said, “I don’t understand it, but okay.”

So Bob was out here. Bob was out here, and he went in and I said, “Do you want my office?”

Adamson: What year was this?

Hutton: 1972, about. Yes, ’72, I think. I said, “You want my office, Bob?”

“Oh no, no, no. I’m taking an office down here.” And he’d go in there and he’d ask for—I said, “Anything you want, ask for it.” I’d go to lunch with him and never could figure out why he was here.

Any rate, one time we were driving, as I recall, across the Pali [Highway], but, anyway, he asked me about my house that I had built on the beach.

Adamson: Where was this?

Hutton: On the beach over there on the other side of the island. All of a sudden, it became clear. Son of a bitch, they think that I built that goddamn house, because he [Bob Carlson] was going through accounting records and everything, they think I built that goddamn house and used some company funds. I told my wife when we started, “I want this thing spic and span. You take care of the books, and I want to make everything—,” you know.

So I said, “Here, Bob. I want you to go through all this, contact the subcontractors and everything. I want to put this behind.”

Adamson: At the time Bob came out, was he operations manager?

Hutton: Yeah.

Adamson: Then he went back?

Hutton: Then he went back there with no job, because they’d filled it with Ralph Tice.

Adamson: And then he came back a second time?

Hutton: No, no, he didn’t come back a second time. He just came back into the company a second time.

Adamson: He wasn’t an accountant, but he was supposed to be doing accounting things.

Hutton: He was a meticulous guy, but he had a world of experience in contracts and everything like that, and costs and everything like that.

So any rate, then I found out—I'd known, in the past, that late 1960s or something like that, Charlie got his tit in a wringer by charging his house in Altadena, about \$680,000, \$650,000, to the owner's side of a contract, and about a year later, after it was already done and everything, they fired the engineer that had been working on the job. Well, the engineer knew it, and so the engineer goes down and tells the owner. Well, the owner is really pissed, you know, and it cost the company \$650,000 or something like that—the company now, not CJP. It cost the company that to bail—to get him to drop everything. They gave him a settlement.

Well, Bob—and that was what it was. He was checking out here to make sure that I hadn't done what Charlie had done—charged the goddamn company with something for building a house.

So, anyway, Bob came in one day a few weeks later, a period of time later, and said, "George, I'm leaving."

I said, "Why?"

He said, "Because I don't belong out here. You don't need me out here. I don't belong here. All it does is confuse the issue, confuse the chain of command. This is your arena. You created it. It's not mine."

Now, all he'd had to do if he wanted this operation was just to say, "You know what? There could be something out there, Charlie." You know what I mean? In other words, further that goddamn thing.

Anyway, he left and he went back to the mainland and retired. He said, "I'm going back to the mainland and retire." And that's what he did.

Then I don't know how long it was later, he came back. Charlie asked him to come back, and he came back for a period of time, but then he left again. When he left again, he had to sue Charlie in order to get what was coming to him.

Adamson: And that's out of the stock ownership of the company?

Hutton: Yeah. Same way with Russ [Osterman]. Russ had to sue him too.

Adamson: Right. That was separate from development deals?

Hutton: I don't know.

Adamson: You were saying early on how Charlie said that people could buy stock in Charles Pankow, Inc.

Hutton: Yeah.

Adamson: I believe Alan Murk had also said that maybe it was by invitation only, but on maybe San Jose Plaza or something, someone like Alan Murk could get in on the partnership. I'm not sure.

Hutton: Yeah, I think I was in the partnership for a while, that San Jose Plaza for a while. But you know the Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away. So I never did put too much credence in what—I put my credence in, quite frankly, the stock of the company.

Adamson: So they do the reorganization. What impact is that just on your operation?

Hutton: I don't know. About 1985 or thereabouts, somewhere around there, Charlie called me and said, "What are you doing next week?"

I said, "Oh, I don't know, same old stuff."

He said, "Why don't you come with me to Singapore."

"What the hell are you going out to Singapore for?"

He said, "Oh, I got a trip. I want to go out there. Why don't you come along. You don't have anything to do."

I said, "All right. Okay. I'll arrange it." So I did, and I thought to myself, "I wonder what the fuck he wants now." [laughs] You know, that's what the question is.

So we get on the airplane, and somewhere between here and Singapore, by the way of Tokyo and whatever, Bangkok, Thailand, we're talking and he says, "We've got to do something about this stock."

I said, "What do you mean?"

He said, "Well, you know, these guys are getting paid too much money."

I said, "What do you mean, too much money?"

He, "Well, you know, they're getting big bonuses and they've got stock in the company and they're making too much money."

I said, “Jesus Christ, Charlie, they earned it. If they put their money up and they earned it, it was risky, and if you don’t want to pay them the bonus, why, that’s another matter. But as far as the stock, they’ve earned that. They’ve put the money up. As far as the efforts is put in, why, they’re earning their pay. As long as they get it, as long as you’re willing to pay them, why, they’re getting it.”

Well, anyway, he said he wanted to cap it, and he wanted to—I can’t remember. He wanted to, anyway, put some kind of a cap on the goddamn thing so that they couldn’t get any more money. So that was the shoe that ultimately dropped, I guess. So I don’t know.

Adamson: So it went from a corporation to a partnership.

Hutton: It wasn’t ever a corporation. It was a—shit, I don’t know. I can’t remember. It may have been. Charlie Pankow, Inc. But I know that, in the late seventies and so forth, every time Christmas would come and we were going to give out bonuses, it was a dog-eat-dog fight, fight, fight. I had to fight for it. They were coughing up money like right and left, and he’s a main recipient of that because he’s the biggest stockholder and so forth, and every time bonuses would come around, discussions would come around, it’d end up in a fight. I one time told him, “Charlie, if you don’t want to pay them the goddamn bonuses, take it out of mine. Just take it out of mine.”

Adamson: In theory, bonuses were supposed to be based on profits or based on what people had—

Hutton: There was no formula. There was no formula.

Adamson: Talk about the late eighties boom and then bust out here and how it sort of was feast and then famine.

Hutton: Well, in the eighties, mid-eighties, is when it really slowed down. They were asking for people on the mainland, and that's when I gave them Bill Heine, that's when I gave them Dick Ackerson, that's when I gave them Red Metcalf, by cutting off my right arm, you know, and Jack Parker went up there. The only ones that made it going up there are ones that had a long-term relationship with Charlie. If they were new, Jack Parker, I mean, he'd never been to the mainland. Dick Ackerson had never been to the mainland. Bill Heine, never been to the mainland. Jim Allyn, never been to the mainland. Bob Hewitt, never been to the mainland. Guys who had had a previous relationship with Charlie were safe. The other guys went up there, every goddamn one of them got canned.

Adamson: Soon after they went there?

Hutton: Yes, within a few months they got canned. And I believe this, I believe that he [Charlie] wanted to emasculate Hawaii. It's not a rational decision, but I believe it.

Adamson: Did he not want an office out here?

Hutton: No, he wanted an office out here, and I believe that he didn't want me to quit particularly, but I also believe that he wanted me to do is kiss his ass in the middle of Bishop Street, just that—"You're God." And that was evident when we were up there in his place up there—that ranch up in—Cecil B.—not Cecil B, DeMille's ranch, but—yeah, yeah, whoever it was.

Adamson: The horses.

Hutton: Yes, the horse ranch when we went up there.

Adamson: When was this?

Hutton: Went up there in '88 or so, and we were having a particular time. Jesus Christ, seemed like every time I got on the phone, I'd go down to the office and wear my cordovan shoes and a pair of slacks and shoes and sit behind my desk like it's a—you know, and then call, because I wanted to be in a business mode when I talked, no casual conversations.

Any rate, every time, I remember one time on the phone, I said, "Goddamn it, Charlie, if you don't like what the fuck I'm doing, fire my ass." Bang. And hung up the phone on him. Goddamn, he pissed me off. And I waited about ten minutes, call him back, said, "I owe you an apology. I shouldn't have hung up on you like that," but he really pissed me off. [laughs]

Adamson: But then you met him out at the ranch?

Hutton: Yes. Business went on and so forth. Anyway, it was at the company meeting, I think, Oral Hershiser had been pitching up there about then.

Adamson: When the Dodgers won the World Series in '88.

Hutton: Yes, '88, I think that's when it was. So any rate, he said, "Why don't you come out to the ranch tomorrow and I'll cook a buffalo burger and we'll have a Bloody Mary or something. Then I'll get a car to take you down to the airport."

"Okay, fine."

Next morning we go out there. I'd been out there before, but any rate, we were talking, everything like that, and then he said something about, "Well, you know, we got to look out." I'm paraphrasing. "We've got to look out for our company."

I said, "Hold on just a second, Charlie. Hold on a second. We got to get something straight here. This is not *our* company. This is *your* company. I just happen to be the second largest stockholder in *your* company."

And he had a drink, he turned and looked at me just like I'm looking at your now, and he said, "I'm glad you made that speech, George."

Well, I'll tell you, when I got in that car, I felt like a great big goddamn load had been taken off my shoulders, because I knew it was useless, the position I was trying to achieve with this company. I was, all the time, it was a "we" company, and he didn't

know what the fuck I was talking about. It's an "I" company. "I." I didn't quit then. It was two years later before I quit.

Adamson: You said you sent these people to the mainland. Wasn't there another boom at the end? Weren't you caught out in the late eighties with projects where you didn't have people?

Hutton: Landmark and a couple others, Honolulu Park Place. Red [Metcalf] came over here for that. Then he went back up there. That took the wind out of my sails, really, because for all these twenty years, I've been fighting for two, and every time you'd send a trusted employee, a guy that was trusted employee, ten, twelve, fifteen years' experience and so forth. Fired. Fired. Fired.

Adamson: I think Al [Fink] said that Landmark was the last project you signed your name on the contract.

Hutton: Yes.

Adamson: I just wanting to confirm the timing.

Hutton: Yeah, yeah that's right, that was about 1990.

Adamson: So Aloha Tower was the—

Hutton: That was after that, 1994. That was not even anything to do with—and then after that, I got invited by these guys to be a partner down there [on Aloha Tower], no different than Charlie might have been invited to be a partner somewhere on the mainland in some thing, and I tried to say, “Well, let me bring the company in,” and these guys said—I’d known them for twenty years and done several jobs with them and so forth. They said, “No, no, George. You’re one thing, but we don’t want Charlie as a partner.”

I said, “Well, how about being able to build the building?”

“Oh, hell, we’ve got no trouble with that. Good job building buildings. It’s not that. We just don’t want him as a partner.”

So I said okay.

So I told Charlie that I’d been invited to be a partner in that Aloha Tower project, and I said, “I see no reason not to. We’re going to end up with a construction contract and it will be some twenty-five, thirty million dollars, or whatever the hell,” and, boy, from then on, he treated me like I was a traitor.

After we signed the contract on the Landmark, there was the University of Hawaii Arena up there, and Charlie said, “Since you don’t have any design/build experience, I’m going to put Dean in charge of it.”

Adamson: Dean?

Hutton: Stephan. I just saw the handwriting on the wall, that he's wanting me to work under situations that I can't handle. So I wrote a letter of resignation in longhand and told Charlotte, "Hold onto it until I tell you."

Adamson: Charlotte?

Hutton: My secretary, or my right arm, you know. Charlotte Tanaka. She still works for me part-time.

So a couple, three weeks later, I said, "Mail it."

Then we were going along, we've got a construction contract, we were working with Dave Schmidt, who's a great young engineer over there, and he's no longer with them. He's a vice president of some organization up in Seattle, Washington, I believe. But, anyway, I'm working with him and all that stuff. Lo and behold, two weeks before—and we have a deadline. We have to pull a building permit by a certain—and two weeks before that, I get this goddamn letter from Charlie saying, "We're pulling out. We're not going to do your job." No explanation, just, "We're not going to do it."

I asked Al [Fink] about it, and he said, "Shit, nobody knows why in the hell." All he was trying to do is get back at me, and when the day I left, all communications ceased. No more. Not invited to any goddamn Christmas parties or anything like that, just—

Adamson: You had to sell out or cash out your stock?

Hutton: Yes, and it took me years. He still owes me. We had all this goddamn—you know, they're intertwined, you know. They're in the agreement, "Do you want to pay taxes?" You get tax benefits one way or the other way and so forth. There'll be a day of reckoning. Hell, I tried for ten years to get this. Tim Murphy called me one time, said, "He owes you \$70,000." I got the recording. And I try to get that resolved, never did. Didn't get it resolved. He dies, and then Rick, his son, sent me a letter and said, "He must have withheld that for some reason, so I'm not going to pay it." Everybody said the only way I'd get it is to go back and sue him for 70,000 bucks.

Adamson: You said that Bill Deuchar's company [U.S. Pacific Builders] did Aloha Tower?

Hutton: Yes.

Adamson: When did he start that, then? When did he start that company?

Hutton: Probably in early nineties. Yes, he probably started that company in the early nineties. He was a casualty, too, I mean not directly, but indirectly, because he saw what was happening and he said, "Shit, I'm getting out of here."

Adamson: So he left Pankow earlier.

Hutton: Yes, he left Pankow probably about the same time Bill Heine did, I think around '85 or something like that. I believe that's right.

Adamson: So after you left Pankow organization, what did you do? What have you done?

Hutton: Well, quite frankly, I worked on the Aloha Tower project, which was not a success because the Japanese pulled out and they lost all this money in there. The Japanese pulled out, and that's about it. I haven't done anything. I mean, the stock market. It's fine.

Adamson: That's the end of my questions, so I guess we can leave it there.

[End of interview]